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S T A T E M E N T O F S - I C M O N 
The { ^ a!- l~ • urisdiction over this matter under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4™ 
103(2)(e) (2008), 1 ho Appellant S. Steven Maese, appeals convictions for a Patlerr of 
and four counts of Exploiting Prostitution, third degree felonies in violations ol L fa, 
Code Ann. § 7b-ItM 306(2). 
STATEMENT O F ISSUES 
P i HI IN I I III " I "1 le State cl i,ai ged l'\ Ir T\ laese \ \ itl i foi ir c o\ n its of Exploitii Lg Prostit i ition. 
Yet its charging documents factually described only one Exploiting Prostitution count. 
The Probable Cause Statement inadequately notified Mr. Maese of the remaining 
c m v - :.i* L « i * ,^. • ' 
culars. The trial court, however, failed to rule on his motion. Should the trial court have 
compelled the State to produce a bill of particulars? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Under Utah law, this Court accords "a trial court's conclusions of law no particular de-
ference, reviewing them for correctness. Here, the question of the adequacy of the notice 
given defendant is one of law/ '1 Mr. Maese preserved this issue by moving the trial 
court for a bill of particulars.2 
POINT II. Under Utah law, jury unanimity means unanimity as to a specific crime 
and as to each element of the crime. The Exploiting Prostitution and Pattern of Unlaw-
ful Activity statutes enumerate separate crimes through distinct actus reus alternatives. 
Furthermore, the State claimed it presented evidence of more Exploiting Prostitution in-
stances than it charged. Did the trial court err by failing to compel the State to elect the 
offenses it would submit to the jury? Next, did the trial court properly instruct the jury: 
• that jury unanimity means unanimity to verdict only; and 
• that tacitly, jurors could individually pick and choose from actus reus alterna-
tives in reaching its verdict. 
Finally, did the trial court err by preventing Mr. Maese from entering juror statements 
into evidence which proved his jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
"Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law presents a question of law which we 
review for correctness/'3 Furthermore, court rules are interpreted "by examining the 
rule's plain language and resort to other methods only if the language is ambiguous/'4 
1
 State v. Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269, f 8,139 P.3d 1066 (quotations and citation omitted). 
2
 R. at 167. 
3
 State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT 118, f 11, 62 P.3d 444. 
~ 2 ~ 
Mr. Maese failed to preserve the election issue, but election is a question of law and 
its lacking has been deemed a manifest injustice.5 
Though raised in his Motion for Arrest of Judgment, Mr. Maese failed to preserve 
his grievance with the trial court's initial jury unanimity instruction at trial and raises it 
as plain error and manifest-injustice on appeal. The trial court's supplemental jury in-
struction was objected to6 and the Utah R. Evid. 606(b) argument was raised in Mr. 
Maese's Motion for Arrest of Judgment.7 
POINT III. Was the evidence at trial sufficient to satisfy required elements of Mr. 
Maese's charged crimes where the State failed to introduce evidence of a "house of 
prostitution," an "inmate," "prostitute" status, an "understanding," and a "prostitution 
business," all necessary elements of Exploiting Prostitution, and where the only "trans-
porting" evidence was inherently improbable? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
This Court will "reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a 
matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction."8 Mr. Maese pre-
served this issue in his Motion for Arrest of Judgment.9 
4
 State v. Quinonez-Gaiton, 2002 UT App 273, f 11, 54 P.3d 139 (alterations omitted). 
5
 State v. Hilberg, 61 P. 215,217 (Utah 1900). 
6
 R. at 862-73. 
7
 R. at 345. 
8
 State v. Robbins, 2006 UT App 324, f 7,142 P.3d 589. 
9
 R. at 369. 
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POINT IV. Utah law requires crimes to be prosecuted by information and in the spe-
cific. Here, the State charged Mr. Maese with a Pattern of Unlawful Activity, but failed 
to enumerate one of its alternatives. The missing alternative was published in jury in-
structions however. Therefore, did the trial court err by giving the jury an instruction 
which allowed them to convict Mr. Maese of a crime he was not charged with violating? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
Under Utah law, "Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law presents a question 
of law which we review for correctness."10 Mr. Maese preserved this issue in his Motion 
for Arrest of Judgment.11 If this Court finds Mr. Maese's objection untimely, he raises it 
as plain error or under Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e)'s "manifest injustice"12 exception. He de-
monstrates that "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable outcome."13 
RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
This Court's interpretation of the following rules, statutes, and constitutional provisions 
is important to the issues on appeal and their full texts are attached at ADDENDUM A: 
RULES 
• Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 4(b), 4(e), 4(h), 12(e), and 12(f) (2008); 
• Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) (2008). 
™ State v. Houskeeper, 2002 UT118, f 11, 62 P.3d 444. 
11
 R. at 358. 
12
 Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e) (2008). 
« State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, \ 26,128 P.3d 1179. 
~ A ~ 
STATUTES 
• Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1301, 76-10-1305, 76-10-1603 (2006). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. 
• Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 13. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 5, 2008, Mr. Maese was charged with a Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a 
second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603; four counts of Ex-
ploiting Prostitution, third degree felony violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(2); 
and Money Laundering, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-
1904(1). Mr. Maese was bound over on all charges. 
Following a two day jury trial, on July 11, 2008, Mr. Maese was convicted of four 
counts of Exploiting Prostitution and the single count of Pattern of Unlawful Activity. 
He was acquitted of Money Laundering.14 
On January 26, 2009, Mr. Maese was sentenced to a term of one-to-fifteen years in 
the State Prison for the second degree felony conviction, and a term of zero-to-five years 
for each of the four third degree felony convictions. The court suspended the prison 
terms but required Mr. Maese to serve sixty days in jail, and placed him on probation.15 
Previously, he filed a timely Motion for Arrest of Judgment, which the court denied.16 
14
 R. at 313. 
15
 R. at 808. 
16
 R. at 323; R. at 733. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Steven Maese had worked for Wells Fargo as a business banker and specialized in mar-
keting.17 Tiffany Curtis had worked as an erotic escort and knew the inside of the escort 
industry.18 In late 2004 the escort agency Curtis worked for, Cinderella's, was put up 
for sale and she wanted to buy it.19 Knowing Mr. Maese's business background, she 
asked him to review its books.20 He did and told Curtis it would cost less to start an 
agency from scratch.21 Mr. Maese and Curtis would have specific roles. He handled ad-
vertising, vendors, IT and similar business decisions, while she primarily interacted 
with the escorts and clients;22 answering phone calls and directing escorts to their vari-
ous appointments.23 Mr. Maese was concerned about operating an escort agency legally 
but Curtis assured him that she made good money while escorting without performing 
sex acts, without breaking the law.24 So was born The Doll House escort agency.25 
Mr. Maese took steps to insure that The Doll House was established and operated 
legally. Mr. Maese and Curtis hired an attorney to set up the business properly;26 he al-
17
 R. at 319-20 (Tr. 109:8:-10, July 10, 2008; Tr. 261:6-7, July 11, 2008.). 
18
 R. at 319 (Tr. 109:14-19, 70:2-3, July 10, 2008.). 
^ R. at 319 (Tr. 110:3-4, July 10, 2008.). 
20
 R. at 319 (Tr. 110:7-11, July 10, 2008.). 
21
 R. at 319 (Tr. 110:12-14, July 10, 2008.). 
22
 R. at 319 (Tr. 70:14-16,136:23-25, July 10, 2008.). 
23
 R. at 319-320 (Tr. 89:3-5:10, July 10, 2008; the word "send" and "sent" occur 37 times 
throughout the trial transcript.). 
24
 R. at 319 (Tr. 108:12-109:7, July 10, 2008.). 
25
 R. at 319 (Tr. 69:15-20, July 10, 2008.). 
26
 R. at 319 (Tr. 110:17-19, July 10, 2008.). 
~ 6 ~ 
so paid attorneys to teach escorts how to work within the law, to prevent prostitution.27 
Moreover, escorts were told that to avoid being arrested, they should not have sex for 
money.28 Mr. Maese never required escorts to perform sex acts.29 Escorts were required 
to be punctual, be congenial, and completely disrobe.30 These requirements, and espe-
cially the nonrequirements, were clearly communicated to all escorts.31 
But on April 5, 2006, on suspicion of a Class B misdemeanor business license viola-
tion, ten Sheriffs Deputies executed a search warrant on Curtis's home.32 While typical-
ly executed in secret, someone tipped off the press, informing them of the warrant's 
execution. A news crew was present before deputies breached the door.33 Six months 
later, on October 5, 2006, Tiffany Curtis and S. Steven Maese were charged with Money 
Laundering, a Pattern of Unlawful Activity, and four counts of Exploiting Prostitution. 
Yet the only factual details set forth in the Amended Information were the place and 
time of the counts. All charges occurred at Curtis's home: 7567 S. 2160 East, and in and 
around Salt Lake County, State of Utah; on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006 
(Curiously, the Doll House began operations well after July, on December 16, 200434).35 
27
 R. at 319-20 (Tr. 72:3-73:10, July 10, 2008; Tr. 323:21-324:10, July 11, 2008.). 
28
 R. at 320 (Tr. 161:4-9, July 11, 2008.). 
29
 R. at 320 (Tr. 146:13-17,159:19-24, 270:16-18, July 11, 2008). 
30
 R. at 320 (Tr. 271:15-19,180:34-181:21, July 11, 2008.). 
31
 R. at 319 (Tr. 106:2-8, July 10,2008.). 
32
 R. at 319 (Tr. 17:23-18:18, July 10, 2008.). 
33
 R. at 319 (Tr. 47:11-23, July 10, 2008.). 
34
 R. at 320 (Tr. 265:22-23, July 11, 2008.). 
35
 R. at 8-13 (The Amended Information is attached at ADDENDUM B). 
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Counts II through V, the Exploiting Prostitution charges, used identical language.36 The 
accompanying probable cause statement applied to both Mr. Maese and Curtis. It al-
leged that through The Doll House escort agency, "MEESE [sic] and CURTIS aided and 
encouraged prostitution../7 It also contained seven subparagraphs from initialed wit-
nesses. Five of the seven subparagraphs implicated Curtis as the sole criminal actor.37 
First, witness A.F. alleged that Curtis encouraged her to perform oral sex on clients 
and that Curtis would refrain from giving her appointments if she failed to pay kick-
backs. A.F. stated that Mr. Maese threatened her if she quit working. Second, H.T. fre-
quently prostituted herself and alleged that she always gave money to Curtis. Mr. 
Maese's name is absent from H.T/s statement. Third, H.R. also frequently prostituted 
herself and alleged that Curtis and Mr. Maese offered her an attorney if she was ever ar-
rested. Fourth, J.H. alleged that Curtis told her clients always wanted sex and that she 
did prostitute herself. J.H. recalled a specific instance where she paid a $200 kickback to 
Curtis personally. She regularly paid Curtis a 20% kickback. J.H. also said Mr. Maese of-
fered her an attorney. Fifth, T.N. alleged that she regularly paid a 20% kickback to Cur-
tis. Moreover, Curtis frequently asked her to perform specific sex acts with particular 
customers, because other escorts were unwilling to.38 
Only N.F. (Nicole Fernandez) and D.T/s (Danielle Thomas) statements accused Mr. 
Maese of crimes. N.F said Mr. Maese told her when specific customers wanted specific 
sex acts. She refused. But despite being given few appointments because of her refusal, 
36
 R. at 9-10 (Amended Information, Counts II-V). 
37
 R. at 11-13 (Probable Cause Statement). 
38
 R. at 11-13 (Probable Cause Statement at 15.). 
~ 8 ~ 
Mr. Maese threatened her when she left The Doll House. D.T. said she was asked by Mr. 
Maese to obtain condoms for a customer and to "work something out/'39 
The State's Amended Information failed to differentiate between counts ascribed to 
Curtis or Mr. Maese.40 Then, at Preliminary Hearing, the State claimed it presented evi-
dence of criminal episodes exceeding the four Exploiting Prostitution counts charged.41 
And although Curtis eventually pled guilty to two counts of Attempted Exploitation of 
Prostitution, the State failed to amend their information a second time.42 Accordingly, 
Mr. Maese moved the trial court for a bill of particulars, but the trial court never ruled.43 
* * * 
At trial, the State introduced substantial testimony that its witnesses prostituted them-
selves on their own initiative. Allyson Jensen and Jennifer Harris testified they prosti-
tuted themselves 50 percent of the time;44 Heather Twede testified she had sex for 
money "maybe a third of the time/'45 Danielle Thomas testified she prostituted herself 
"at least 60 to 70 percent"46 of the time. Heather Wright testified she prostituted herself 
"Probably at least 90 percent of the calls."47 Nicole Fernandez said that she "had sex 
39
 R. at 11-13 (Probable Cause Statement at \5.). 
40
 R. at 8-13 (Amended Information and Probable Cause Statement combined.). 
41
 R. at 81 (Tr. 137:6-11, April 3, 2007.). 
42
 R. 319 (Tr. 74:24-75:6, July 10, 2008.). 
43
 R. at 716. 
44
 R. at 319-320 (Tr. 125:3, July 10,2008; 151:18-23, Tr. July 11,2008.). 
45
 R. at 320 (Tr. 167:13, July 11, 2008.). 
46
 R. at 320 (Tr. 183:19, July 11, 2008.). 
47
 R. at 320 (Tr. 210:24, July 11,2008.). 
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with all of them."48 And while all escorts had plea agreements in place,49 each failed to 
testify that Mr. Maese required or pressured them to prostitute.50 Escorts rarely spoke 
to Mr. Maese regarding clients and appointments; they generally spoke with Curtis.51 
On each appointment, escorts were required to collect $145 from the client; $95 paid 
to the company and $50 to the escort.52 Escorts were required to collect this fee within 
the first ten minutes of the appointment, before initiating any services.53 This prevented 
clients from withholding money upon learning that sex acts were not for sale.54 Subse-
quently, escorts would negotiate fees for any additional services provided to clients.55 
Shower shows, lap dances, back rubs, and dirty talk were such optional services.56 
From these additional services fees, escorts often tipped Curtis personally—not the 
business —a portion of their earnings.57 This was considered a gratuity for sending an 
escort on the call.58 Although one escort testified she saw all monies comingled,59 Curtis 
48
 R. at 320 (Tr. 240:21, July 11, 2008.). 
49
 DEFENSE EXHIBITS 31-34. 
50
 R. at 319-20 (Tr. 114:7-11, July 10,2008; Tr. 153:13-24,160:15-24,174:19-25, 201:4-6, 
218:19-219:16, July 11, 2008.). 
51
 R. at 320 (Tr. 224:2-225-2, July 11,2008; 
52
 R. at 319 (Tr. 88:17-21, July 10, 2008.). 
53
 R. at 320 (Tr. 148:2-10, July 11, 2008.). 
54
 R. at 320 (Tr. 159:25-160:2, 274:11-23, July 11, 2008.). 
55
 R. at 320 (Tr. 147:24-148:16, July 10,2008.). 
56
 R. at 320 (Tr. 267:2-3, July 11,2008.). 
57
 R. at 319 (Tr. 88:22-89:2,136:1-8, July 10,1008.). 
58
 R. at 320 (Tr. 182:4-18, July 11,2008.). 
59
 R. at 320 (Tr. 222:8, July 10,2008.). 
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herself testified that she kept the tips and The Doll House never shared in or received 
any tip money.60 Importantly, Mr. Maese never received or shared in any tip money.61 
On occasion, tales of the escorts' additional services appeared on The Erotic Review 
("TER"). The Erotic Review is a nationwide website for the posting and reading of escort, 
massage parlor, and gentlemen's clubs reviews.62 TER's gossip, however, is posted ano-
nymously and cannot be verified as true or fictitious.63 
TER contained stories alleging Doll House escorts engaged in sex acts. Mr. Maese 
read some of these various tales.64 Furthermore, Curtis and Mr. Maese discussed stories 
they had read on TER65 and jointly posted fictitious stories containing sex acts.66 
During a company meeting, Mr. Maese shared printed examples of good and bad 
reviews with escorts, but any references to sex acts were redacted.67 As Curtis recalled, 
bad reviews were given for behavior such as, "A girl talking on her cell phone with her 
boyfriend; a girl refusing to be nice, to even you know, refusing to get naked, any num-
ber of things can cause a bad review.. ."68 not necessarily for failing to perform sex acts. 
60
 R. at 319 (Tr. 105:13-21, Tr. 138:4-6, July 10, 2008.). 
61
 R. at 320 (Tr. 277:19-278:10, July 11, 2008.). 
62
 R. at 319 (Tr. 16:18-21, July 10, 2008.). 
63
 R. at 319 (Tr. 43:1-44:13, July 10, 2008; Tr. 106:9-107:3, July 11, 2008.). 
64
 R. at 320 (Tr. 311:4-9, July 11, 2008.). 
65
 R. at 319 (Tr. 83:14-17, July 10, 2008.). 
66
 R. at 319 (Tr. 116:15-117:5, July 10, 2008.). 
67
 R. at 319 (Tr. 24:3-27:9, Jul 10, 2008; Tr. 114:17-21, July 10,2008.). 
68
 R. at 319 (Tr. 114:23-115:1, July 10, 2008.). 
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Beyond TER, Mr. Maese participated in, or was present at, various conversations 
with escorts. Mr. Maese was present when an escort spontaneously declared she had 
performed oral sex on a client.69 He attended a bachelor party where two escorts per-
formed oral sex on each other.70 An escort also told Mr. Maese she had been raped;71 
upon hearing this, he offered to call the police himself— on behalf of the woman—but 
the woman declined.72 Mr. Maese told an escort that the $300 per hour she was charg-
ing was unreasonable, yet the escort never explicitly referenced sex73 saying, "sex 
wasn't said/'74 Curtis also testified that the escort never explicitly discussed sex.75 
Witnesses also testified that Mr. Maese spoke with them regarding specific ap-
pointments. Danielle Thomas, who was diagnosed with bi-polar disorder and at the 
time of trial was being treated for it by a psychiatrist, a therapist and a medical doctor 
with Proflexor, Abilify, Xanax and Ambien,76 testified that she was directed to buy con-
doms for a client and to make him happy.77 Yet she also remembered telling police "I 
really fucking hate his ass. Fm talking like, like I really fucking hate him.,/78 And "I will 
take [The Doll House] down just to fucking get a good kick, ha, ha, about it... Yeah, I 
69
 R. at 319 (Tr. 88:11-13, July 10, 2008.). 
70
 R. at 319 (Tr. 97:24, July 10, 2008.). 
71
 R. at 320 (Tr. 168:19-171:22, July 11, 2008.). 
72
 R. at 320 (Tr. 173:11-15, July 11, 2008.). 
73
 R. at 320 (Tr. 188:9:10, July 11, 2008.). 
74
 R. at 320 (Tr. 202:12-13, July 11, 2008.). 
75
 R. at 319 (Tr. 103:18-22, July 10, 2008, "Okay, I can't say that..."). 
76
 R. at 320 (Tr. 204:19-21, July 11, 2008; Tr. 206:19-20, July 11, 2008.). 
77
 R. at 320 (Tr. 186:20-21, July 11, 2008.). 
78
 R. at 320 (Tr. 203:7-8, July 11, 2009.). 
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want to shut him down. I want to ruin his life just because he's a cocksuck."79 Expected-
ly, she admitted having a "vendetta" against Mr. Maese.80 
Nicole Fernandez also disliked Mr. Maese. Her testimony completely contradicted 
her police interview wherein she confessed to prostituting herself with her personal 
clients, but not with The Doll House clients.81 At trial, she stated that Mr. Maese drove 
her to an appointment and was told it was "not just a lap dance or dancing or any-
thing," and that the customer usually paid "like $400."82 Subsequently, when being 
picked up, she told him she had performed oral sex, and "you need to be a little more 
liberal than that" was the reply.83 Like Thomas, she told police, "I hate him, he's a little 
fucker, you know, and even on bad people I don't wish bad things but I just wish you 
know, I'll tell you so that he can get his everything gone."84 
Lastly, Ally son Jensen, who left The Doll House in December of 2005,85 testified that 
in early April, 2006, her mother received a letter.86 Curtis attributed the authorship to 
Mr. Maese.87 The letter accused Jensen of being a prostitute and included photos of her 
from the Internet. The letter also directed the reader to her reviews on TER. 
79
 R. at 320 (Tr. 203:25-204:2, 204:8-9, July 11, 2008.). 
80
 R. at 320 (Tr. 205:16-18, July 11, 2008.). 
81
 R. at 320 (Tr. 245:5-249:8, July 11, 2008.). 
82
 R. at 320 (Tr. 233:18-19, 234:5-20, July 11, 2008.). 
83
 R. at 320 (Tr. 235:18, 236:4, 235:21-25, July 11, 2008.). 
84
 R. at 320 (Tr. 248:22-25, July 11, 2008.). 
85
 R. at 319 (Tr. 121:6, July 10, 2008.). 
86
 R. at 319 (Tr. 133:2-9, July 10, 2008.). 
87
 R. at 319 (Tr. 99:15-17, July 10, 2008.). 
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In his closing argument, the Deputy District Attorney argued that Danielle Thomas's 
testimony proved "one specific instance of conduct where he exploited a prostitute as 
it's defined under Utah law."88 He then argued that the letter to Allyson Jensen's moth-
er proved an Exploiting Prostitution count and that Mr. Maese "has absolutely encour-
aged or induced another to remain a prostitute."89 Next he argued that Nicole 
Fernandez's testimony proved Mr. Maese, "Did transport a person into or within the 
state for the purpose of prostitution."90 Continuing, the prosecutor argued that Heather 
Twede's rape established Mr. Maese Exploited Prostitution because "they still took that 
agency fee despite what had happened."91 No evidence was presented that Twede paid 
The Doll House, much less Mr. Maese, any fee from this incident. 
Next, the prosecutor rhetorically asked the jury if Mr. Maese "procure[d] inmates for 
a house of prostitution or place women into prostitution? Absolutely. That was the 
whole purpose of that website and that was the whole purpose of the advertising to 
bring those girls in."92 It was then nebulously argued that each interview Mr. Maese 
participated in—in conjunction with advertising—was a distinct instance where Mr. 
Maese encouraged women to "become or remain a prostitute."93 Regarding Jennifer 
Harris, the prosecutor argued that "she had allowed sexual conduct and she did in 
88
 R. at 320 (Tr. 347:25-348:2, July 11, 2008.). 
89
 R. at 320 (Tr. 348:15-19, July 11, 2008.). 
9
° R. at 320 (Tr. 351:15-19, July 11, 2008.). 
91
 R. at 320 (Tr. 352:10-14, July 11, 2008.). 
92
 R. at 320 (Tr. 375:12-15, July 11, 2008.). 
93
 R. at 320 (Tr. 375:17-18, July 11, 2008.). 
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about 50 percent of the cases and she did about 300 appointments. That's 150 right 
there."94 As the State concluded it argued, "We've shown actually more than the neces-
sary charges in terms of the separate instances of exploitation of a prostitute."95 In total, 
the State argued it proved Mr. Maese Exploited Prostitution at least 155 times. 
SUMMARY O F ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The Utah Constitution requires the State to provide a physical copy of 
charges against a defendant with sufficient factual details to enable an adequately pre-
pared defense. The information charging Mr. Maese failed to adequately articulate acts 
constituting crimes; therefore he requested a bill of particulars. No bill was provided. 
Therefore, the central question is: Factually and specifically for each count, what was 
Mr. Maese charged with? The State failed to answer this question and the record shows 
that even with hindsight, it is unanswerable. The State's failure to factually illuminate 
the charges gave it nearly unfettered latitude in presenting its case. Immune from va-
riance, the State's moving target prevented Mr. Maese from offering a cogent defense. 
This structural error merits reversal and remand. 
POINT II. Jury unanimity means unanimity as to a specific crime and as to each ele-
ment of the crime. First, both Exploiting Prostitution and Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
define multiple actus reus alternatives under which a jury may convict; this means both 
statutes define multiple crimes. Second, the State claimed it presented evidence of over 
155 Exploiting Prostitution instances from which to convict. This convergence jeopar-
94
 R. at 320 (Tr. 375:23-25, July 11, 2008.). 
95
 R. at 320 (Tr. 380:21-23, July 11, 2008.). 
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dized jury unanimity by providing the jury with limitless theories to convict Mr. Maese 
under. The jurors could pick-and-choose from the evidence to fulfill each count. This 
should have alarmed the trial court. It needed to give a detailed and specific jury un-
animity instruction or compel the State to elect which specific acts it would submit to 
the jury for deliberation. Instead, it issued a unanimity instruction that applied to ver-
dict only and was legally incorrect. Next, the jury's question from deliberations re-
minded the trial court that unanimity was compromised. This should have prompted a 
detailed jury unanimity instruction in response. Lastly, Utah R. Evid. 606(b) permits 
statements that prove a jury has rendered an invalid verdict. Therefore, the trial court 
should have considered juror statements proving a nonunanimous verdict. These errors 
deprived Mr. Maese of jury unanimity and warrant reversal and remand. 
POINT III. The State must prove all elements of an offense including mens rea and at-
tendant circumstances. In this case, the State failed to introduce evidence of a "house of 
prostitution/7 an "inmate/7 "prostitute" status, an "understanding/7 and a "prostitution 
business" all attendant circumstances. Moreover, the State failed to introduce evidence 
of intentional mens rea, repeatedly arguing that it had proved knowledge only. Addi-
tionally, the State's witness's testimony regarding an incident of "transporting" was in-
herently improbable. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the evidence at trial 
greatly deviated from the allegations charged in the Amended Information. For all these 
reasons, the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain the convictions. 
POINT IV. Utah Law requires informations to charge by statute or by stating in con-
cise terms the definition of the offense. The information charging Mr. Maese with a Pat-
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tern of Unlawful Activity failed to enumerate the statute's last subsection. Yet Mr. 
Maese's jury instructions recited the final subsection, allowing the jury to convict him of 
a crime, a distinct actus reus, that he was not charged with. The trial court erred by is-
suing this jury instruction and this error should have been obvious to the trial court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. The State failed to provide Mr. Maese with adequate notice of the 
charges against him and the trial court erred by failing to compel the 
State to provide a bill of particulars. 
The risk of losing liberty is a formidable jeopardy. Therefore, both the Federal and Utah 
constitutions grant an accused the fundamental right to know the nature of the offense 
with which he is charged.96 This "requires the prosecution to state the charge with suffi-
cient specificity to protect the defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same crime 
and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense/'97 In State v. Wil-
cox, the Utah Supreme Court held that if "the elements of the crimes are covered by the 
factual allegations"98 within the information, the State has provided adequate notice.99 
Importantly, adequate notice must be provided in specific documents. In State v. 
Bernards, this Court held that, "The probable cause statement... and Amended Informa-
96
 State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 17 n. 1, 94 P.3d 186, Citing Utah Const., Article 
I, Section 12, and U.S. Const, amend. VI; State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1031 (Utah 
1991), Citing Utah and U.S. Const. Due Process Clauses. 
97
 State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238,115,166 P.3d 626. 
98
 State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1033 (Utah 1991). 
99
 State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100,104 (Utah 1988); State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 
1985). 
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tion, should be considered as part of the notice given Defendant/'100 A bill of particulars 
also contributes to adequate notice. Other documents, such as discovery and evidence 
from pretrial hearings, specifically, have been excluded from adequate notice, however. 
In State v. Bell, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the State's assertion that "materials 
provided to [the defendant] through pretrial discovery"101 constituted adequate notice: 
[W]e reject the implication of the State's argument... that [the defendant] had 
pretrial access to a mass of various items of information from which, one can 
conclude in hindsight, [the defendant] could have gleaned the State's theories for 
the essential elements of the crimes charged. For this Court to accept such an ar-
gument. .. would negate the accused's constitutional right... to "have a copy" of 
a document setting out in clear terms "the nature and cause of the accusation."102 
Moreover, discovery is precluded from contributing towards adequate notice be-
cause it is beyond the record's scope. In Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co., the 
Utah Supreme Court held that "the findings of all triers of fact, either court or jury, 
must be based upon testimony of witnesses or other evidence made a part of the 
record/'103 Accordingly, any findings of fact based on discovery are invalid; without a 
foundation, facts found by speculation are clearly erroneous. 
Therefore, the Bell Court then established a three part test to determine if a defen-
dant has received adequate notice: (1) whether the information itself is detailed enough 
to give a defendant sufficient notice of the charges; (2) whether a defendant exercises 
100
 State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238,117,166 P.3d 626. 
101




 Salt Lake City v. United Park City Mines Co., 503 P.2d 850, 852 (Utah 1972) (emphasis 
added). 
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the right to seek more particular notice by requesting a bill of particulars under Utah R. 
Crim. P. 4(e); and (3) whether the State met the burden of providing adequate notice.104 
Upon establishing deficient notice, the Utah Supreme Court held that the error is 
structural, with prejudice presumed. Again, in State v. Bell, the Utah Supreme Court 
noted "the record cannot reveal how adequate notice of the charges would have af-
fected the actions of defense counsel, either in preparing for trial or in presenting the 
case to the jury"105 and therefore the State's burden is to prove the error was harmless. 
Applying the Bell test here shows that the State deprived Mr. Maese of adequate no-
tice. The Information and Probable Cause Statement, considered in concert, fail to pro-
vide Mr. Maese with sufficient factual details for the charged crimes. Mr. Maese 
requested a bill of particulars in conformity with Utah R. Crim. P. 4(e) yet the State nev-
er produced a bill and the trial court failed to compel it to do so. 
A. The Amended Information charging Mr. Maese failed to provide him with the 
sufficient notice and factual detail required to adequately prepare a defense. 
1. Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute defines five conceptually distinct crimes. 
Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute defines five separate crimes, not merely one crime 
which may be committed in several different ways. This is because Exploiting Prostitu-
tion provides "alternatives for the actus reus of the charged crime."106 Those five concep-
tually distinct acts are: 
104
 State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100,104-05 (Utah 1988). 
105
 State v. Bellf 770 P.2d 100,106 (Utah 1988) (quotations, brackets, and citations omit-
ted). 
106
 State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,565 (Utah 1987). 
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(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of prostitu-
tion for one who would be an inmate; 
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become or re-
main a prostitute; 
(c) transports a person into or within this state, with the purpose to promote that 
person's engaging in prostitution, procuring or paying for the transportation 
with that purpose; 
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute share the proceeds of 
prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding that he is to 
share therein; or 
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in associa-
tion with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business.107 
These alternatives are discrete criminal activities; separate and distinct actus reus ele-
ments constituting separate and distinct crimes. Accordingly: 
In subsection (a) the actor succeeds in explicitly recruiting an individual for a 
house of prostitution as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(1); 
In subsection (b) the actor's speech or conduct encourages a person to change sta-
tus from nonprostitute to prostitute or to remain in prostitute status; 
In subsection (c) the actor must physically transport a person, or pay for trans-
portation, with the intent that the person transported will engage in prostitution 
as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302(1); 
In subsection (d) the actor, before sharing, agrees to take profits from prostitution 
as defined by Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302(1) and then shares in those profits; 
In subsection (e) the actor operates a house of prostitution as defined by Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(1), or an explicit prostitution business, and is episodic. 
Because the Exploiting Prostitution statute defines five separate crimes, and Mr. 
Maese is entitled "to be charged with a specific crime/'108 the State cannot generally cite 
107
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1) (2006). 
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the statute to provide adequate notice. Yet despite supplementing the Information with 
a probable cause statement, the State failed to adequately notify Mr. Maese. 
2. The Probable Cause Statement details two crimes, only one qualifying as Exploit-
ing Prostitution. 
The State deprived Mr. Maese of the factual basis for the charges against him. The State 
charged Mr. Maese via an Amended Information which recited, verbatim, Utah's Pat-
tern of Unlawful Activity,109 Money Laundering,110 and Exploiting Prostitution111 sta-
tues, but no facts. The accompanying Probable Cause Statement112 detailed only two 
factual episodes that allege Mr. Maese committed crimes. 
• ... N.F. describes one particular instance where MEESE (sic) ordered her to an 
appointment where the customer wanted sex. N.F. tried not to have sex, and 
the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then called N.F. and told her 
"B*tch, you're gonna have to make it work/7... N.F. states she was not given 
many appointments because she would not have sex with clients.113 
This witness clearly asserts that she is not a prostitute ("she would not have sex with 
clients/7) and accuses Mr. Maese of making statements that could reasonably be inferred 
as encouraging her to change her status to prostitute. 
• D.T.... states that she would have sex for money while working for the Doll 
House. D.T. describes on one particular occasion being asked by a customer 
to have sexual intercourse for $200.00 without a condom. When D.T. refused, 
the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then got on the phone and 
108
 Orem City v. Martineau, 2006 UT App 136, \ 6,135 P.3d 884. 
109
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603, sans subsection (4) (2006). 
110
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903 (2006). 
111
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). 
112
 Attached at ADDENDUM B. 
113
 R. at 11 (Probable Cause Statement at \% § a.). 
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told D.T. to drive down the hill and get condoms and go back and "work 
something out."114 
The witness is a prostitute and accuses Mr. Maese of asking her to buy condoms and 
telling her to "work something out." These facts fail to satisfy any Exploiting Prostitu-
tion alternative but qualify as a crime under Aiding Prostitution's115 "procures or at-
tempts to procure a prostitute for a patron" alternative. 
3. The Probable Cause Statement's remaining allegations fail to articulate crimes. 
The remaining allegations range from benign to scandalous, yet none articulate crimes. 
Overall, the State's document recounts legal conduct and cannot substantiate Counts I 
through V of the Information. The allegations are: 
• A.F... states that MEESE (sic) threatened her if she did not continue working 
for Doll House.116 
A threat by itself is not illegal. This statement fails to inform Mr. Maese if the State 
alleges he threatened to sue A.F. for breach of contract, or if he threatened to key A.F/s 
car. Mr. Maese cannot divine the factual basis of any crime from this language, let alone 
Exploiting Prostitution's necessary elements. 
• H.T.... states she did have sex with clients for money, and that she always 
paid CURTIS out at the cottonwood address following the appointments.117 
This paragraph fails to allege any crime against Mr. Maese. 
114
 R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at f 5, § f.). 
115
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304(b) (2006). 
116
 R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at Tf5, § b.). 
117
 R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at 15, § c) . 
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• H.R. states that MEESE (sic) and CURTIS told her that if she ever got arrested 
for prostitution, to not say anything, and they would provide a lawyer for 
her.11* 
The Exploiting Prostitution statute does not prohibit Mr. Maese from informing H.R. 
of her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Similarly, providing an attorney to an 
individual in police custody does not demonstrate an Exploiting Prostitution element. 
• J.H... states that MEESE [sic] told her they would pay for a lawyer if she 
would not talk to police. J.H. states that money was paid out to CURTIS 
and/or MEESE [sic] at the Cottonwood address every time.119 
Again, offering to pay for J.H/s legal fees fails to constitute criminal conduct. Next, 
paying money owed in the course of employment as a licensed escort is legal and ex-
pected. The document may imply that Mr. Maese operated a sexually oriented business 
without a license, but the factual basis for Exploiting Prostitution is nonexistent. 
• T.N... states that in practice the girls frequently told CURTIS and MEESE [sic] 
of the specific sex acts they perform.120 
This hearsay statement—the witness alleges others told Mr. Maese about sex acts — 
fails to constitute a crime under Utah law. Hearing someone recount a crime, allegedly 
committed by a third party, is not a crime. The Utah Supreme Court has long held that 
"the mere presence where a crime is being committed... without such an intent to join 
therein, being shown, is not sufficient to find that one is an accomplice/7121 
118
 R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at | 5 , § d.). 
119
 R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at f 5, § e.). 
120
 R. at 13 (Probable Cause Statement at | 5 , § g.). 
121
 State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794, 797 (Utah 1977). 
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The State's remaining allegations pertain to Tiffany Curtis. But conduct ascribed to 
Curtis cannot be charged to Mr. Maese —the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution prohibits guilt by association.122 
* * * 
The State's Information and Probable Cause Statement are too vague to provide Mr. 
Maese with sufficient notice of his charges because they fail to enumerate "the elements 
of the crimes [by] factual allegations;"123 these documents lack sufficient relevant facts. 
Furthermore, the Information and Probable Cause Statement cannot be reconciled 
because they fail to provide a nexus —customarily done through specific times, places, 
or participants —between counts in the Information and paragraphs in the Probable 
Cause Statement. Counts II through V use identical generic statutory language as a de-
scriptor and a vast 22 month ("July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006") time frame. This 
vague window is not the "best information the prosecution has... that may be useful in 
helping to fix a date, time or place of the alleged offenses"124 because, as evidenced by 
the Probable Cause Statement, the State had temporal windows as short as two months. 
This served as an effective strategy to preserve the State's case from haphazard wit-
nesses, but fails as an exception for denying Mr. Maese adequate notice. 
4. In this case, adequate notice exceptions are inapplicable. 
When the State predicates charges on adult witnesses, notice exceptions are inapplica-
ble. The Utah Supreme Court has "recognized that there are notice problems, especially 
122
 Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11,18-19 (1966). 
123
 State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1033 (Utah 1991). 
124
 State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, f 27,106 P.3d 734 (quotations and citation omitted). 
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as to the date, place, and time, inherent in prosecutions based on the testimony of very 
young victims,"125 therefore the Court has "been less vigorous in requiring specificity as 
to time and place when young children are involved than would usually be the case 
where an adult is involved/7126 In this case, Mr. Maese's youngest accuser is in her mid 
20s; his oldest is nearly 35. These witnesses do not enjoy the same latitude as an eight 
year old; and even in child abuse cases, facts are connected to counts by using initials. 
Admittedly, "there are few ironclad rules for determining the adequacy of notice 
beyond the requirement that the elements of the offense be alleged."127 But here, the 
State's Information and Probable Cause Statement are woefully inadequate in alleging 
facts for the crimes charged. Therefore, Mr. Maese satisfies the Bell test's first prong. 
B. Mr. Maese sought more particular notice by requesting a bill of particulars. 
On May 27, 2008, Mr. Maese filed his Motion for Bill of Particulars. Filed almost 45 days 
prior to Mr. Maese's trial date, the State opposed, but failed to object to, Mr. Maese's 
Motion. On July 7, 2008, the Trial Court heard oral arguments regarding this Motion. 
Mr. Maese satisfied the Bell test's second prong. 
C. The State failed to provide Mr. Maese with a bill of particulars and the trial 
court failed to rule on his Motion. 
The State failed to provide Mr. Maese with a bill of particulars and the trial court failed 
to rule on Mr. Maese's Motion. These facts satisfy the Bell test's third prong. The trial 
court's failure to rule on Mr. Maese's Motion merits attention however. 
125
 State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1032 (Utah 1991). 
126
 Id. at 1033. 
127
 Id. at 1032. 
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1. The Trial Court erred by not ruling on Mr. Maese's Motion for Bill of Particu-
lars, and then created a post hoc rationalization to justify its error. 
Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, pretrial motions must be ruled on before trial: 
A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for 
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where fac-
tual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings 
on the record.128 
Rule 12(e) exists because, as the Utah Supreme Court reasoned, "issues are for the 
trial court to decide and... the findings of fact must reveal how the court resolved each 
material issue."129 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also concluded that "an appellate 
court does not consider issues not ruled upon below..." and therefore "it is appropriate 
to remand the case to the district court to first address this issue."130 
Remanding constitutional issues to a trial court can be problematic, however. In 
State v. Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court held that a post-trial ruling regarding a consti-
tutional question is an inappropriate remedy and a retrial is required: 
To ask the trial court to address the [motion] now would be to tempt it to reach a 
post hoc rationalization for the [resulting effect]... Such a mode of proceeding 
holds too much potential for abuse. The only fair way to proceed is to vacate de-
fendant's conviction and remand the matter for retrial.131 
The trial court in this case fulfilled the Ramirez Court's fears. In issuing its Memo-
randum Decision and Order on Mr. Maese's Motion for Arrest of Judgment,132 the trial 
128
 Utah R. Crim. P. 12(e) (2008) (emphasis added). 
129
 Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). 
130
 United States v. Walters, 269 F.3d 1207,1219 (10th Cir. 2001). 
131
 State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 789 (Utah 1991). 
132
 Attached at ADDENDUM C. 
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court misstated the facts and the law. For example, in reciting the Probable Cause 
Statement charging Mr. Maese, the trial court wrote: 
(b) an escort with the initials A.F. was encouraged by Mr. Maese during October 
and December 2005 to engage in oral sex without a condom and that if she didn't 
engage in sex acts she would not get work;133 
Yet the Probable Cause Statement, quoted in whole and verbatim, shows: 
b. A.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between October and December of 
2005, states that MEESE [sic] threatened her if she did not continue working for 
Doll House. A.F. states CURTIS regularly encouraged good reviews on TER, and 
specifically encouraged bbbj, which is a term for oral sex without a condom. A.F. 
states that CURTIS made clear that if she did not tip the phone girl, which was 
usually her self [sic] (the person that sets appointments), she would not get any 
more appointments.134 
The alleged illegal conduct is clearly attributed to Mr. Maese's former codefendant, 
Tiffany Curtis. 
Additionally, the trial court's order misstates the law. For example, the court cites 
State v. Bernards135 for the proposition that "specific dates are not necessary when a 
count is part of an ongoing criminal enterprise/'136 Yet in State v. Bernards this Court 
noted that, after receiving a motion for bill of particulars, the trial court compelled the 
State to narrow the timeframe for each count alleged. The State complied, narrowing 
down to a month for one count, and to single dates for two counts. More importantly, 
this Court found that that, "The probable cause statement also provided detailed facts 
133
 R. at 720 (Memorandum Decision and Order at 25.). 
134
 R. at 12 (Probable Cause Statement at f 5, § b.). 
135
 State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238,166 P.3d 626. 
136
 R. at 723 (Memorandum Decision and Order at 28.). 
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associated with each charged offense."137 Furthermore, in Bernards, references to an 
"ongoing criminal enterprise" are nonexistent. 
Thus here, as predicted by the Utah Supreme Court, the trial court succumbed to its 
temptation to reach a post hoc rationalization for its failure to rule on Mr. Maese's Mo-
tion for Bill of Particulars; compromising Mr. Maese's right to adequate notice. 
i. The trial court's waiver claim misinterprets Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f). 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the trial court asserted that Mr. Maese waived 
his right to a ruling on his motion for a bill of particulars. Here the record shows that 
the trial court asked both litigants if they were ready to proceed with trial. Both parties 
answered affirmatively. Yet Mr. Maese did not, and could not, have knowingly and in-
telligently waived his right to adequate notice through a general question. 
Importantly, knowing and intelligent is the standard for waiver of counsel,138 Mi-
randa rights,139 entering a guilty plea,140 even waiving a probation revocation hear-
ing.141 Furthermore, the trial court's analysis, predicated on Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 12(f), is flawed. Rule 12(f) states in relevant part: 
Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make re-
quests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall con-
stitute waiver thereof.. ,142 
137
 State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238,117,166 P.3d 626. 
138 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972). 
139
 State v. Barrett, 2006 UT App 417, \ 11,147 P.3d 491. 
140
 State v. Bedstead, 2006 UT 42, \ 16,140 P.3d 1288. 
141
 State v. Martin, 1999 UT App 62, f 13, 977 P.2d 1224. 
142
 Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f) (2008). 
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In this case, the State and the trial court received Mr. Maese's motion for a bill of 
particulars143 and heard oral arguments;144 all parties knew the matter was ripe for de-
cision. These facts are uncontested; consequently, Mr. Maese made a timely request 
prior to trial and Rule 12(f)'s mandates are satisfied. 
Yet under the trial court's theory, these documented realities are irrelevant; a trial 
court can inoculate itself against any Rule 12(e) claims, pursuant to Rule 12(f), by asking 
a general and customary "readiness" question. Therefore the trial court's rule interpre-
tation requires Mr. Maese to nag the trial court into ruling on his motion. But Mr. Maese 
has no affirmative obligation to, and moreover cannot, compel the trial court to rule. 
The trial court maintains its obligation to enter a decision before the start of trial. To 
hold otherwise renders, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e) meaningless. 
The record shows that the trial court had the first opportunity to address the ade-
quate notice claim but abdicated its responsibility. The trial court's theory— that Mr. 
Maese's counsel would identify an adequate notice issue, move for a bill of particulars, 
orally argue the merits, then waive his right to adequate notice in the eleventh hour— 
creates an ineffective assistance of counsel issue which overcomes the waiver claim. 
* * * 
In his State v. Wilcox dissent, Justice Stewart noted that "the more amorphous the prose-
cution's case, the less notice the defendant receives and the less chance the defendant 
will have of defending... If the defendant goes to trial on [vague information], the result 
143
 R. at 167. 
144
 R. at 197. 
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is virtually foreordained/'145 Here, inadequate notice created an inherently unfair 
framework, not just a flaw in trial presentation; structural error. 
As the Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Cruz, "Structural errors are flaws in the 
framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial 
process itself."146 Inadequate notice deprived Mr. Maese —and they jury —of a roadmap 
to follow the case. By failing to correlate each count with specific witnesses or victims, 
the State made the scope of its case practically limitless. And considering the incalcula-
ble number of interactions Mr. Maese had with scores of escorts over the course of near-
ly two years, the State's failure rendered its case immune from variance. 
A bill of particulars' — and adequate notice's —purpose is to bind the State to specific 
facts. In State v. Myers, the Utah Supreme Court wrote, "The bill of particulars thus lim-
its the field of inquiry under the charge laid in the information."147 Yet not bound to any 
unified theories of law or fact, here, the State presented the jury with a moving target. 
At trial, the State argued it proved Mr. Maese Exploited Prostitution at least 155 
times and emphasized, "We've shown actually more than the necessary charges in 
terms of the separate instances of exploitation of a prostitute."148 Mr. Maese was preju-
diced when, by anticipating to defend against four counts of Exploiting Prostitution, he 
unexpectedly had to answer more than 150 accusations. Mr. Maese's defense, predi-
cated on the State's Amended Information, was only l /40 t h of what was necessary. This 
145
 State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028,1035-36 (Utah 1991) (Stewart, J. dissenting). 
146
 State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45,117,122 P.3d 543 (quotations and citations omitted). 
147
 State v. Myers, 302 P.2d 276, 279 (Utah 1956). 
148
 R. at 320 (Tr. 376:23-25, 380:21-23, July 11, 2008.). 
~30~ 
si TI i; :t i iral erroi affected 1\ Ir ]\ laese's ei itire ti Ial ai id led to a \ ei y foreseeable 01 rt coi r t E": 
An unconstrained prosecution and a jury that lacked unanimity. 
POINT II. Mr. Maese's right to jury unanimity was violated because: (1) the trial 
court failed to compel the State to elect offenses; (2) its initial jury un 
animity instruction obviously miscommunicated Utah law; then (3) it 
compounded this error with its supplemental instruction; and (4) it 
erred by barring juror statements showing that Mr. Maese's jury failed 
to reach a unanimous verdict. 
Jury unanimity is a fundamental principle and right of justice in American criminal law; 
"a right so fundamental that it may not be wai\ eu .; * L tali, constitutionally manda-
ted15' n • -, • •*• i v. • * • ' "d -1 • V*
 ( nch clement ui 
the cnim1.' j ! I! - iM >t * -n*>ugh that [the jury] s imply unan imous ly agree on guilt."1 5 2 
T;'.'•!'» :' i State prosecutes ai i ii Ldr • icii ial i n ider a stati ite tl lat defii les 
separate crimes: o\ O» ^ here the State presents evidence of a greater n u m b e r of sepa-
rate criminal offenses than a defendant r- K .uirgcd w iti \w unanimity is jeopardized. 
A ' * ' ' *' . ^ )reme Coi irt 1 leld tl i,at 
one of two mechanisms, election of offenses or a specific jury unanimi ty instruction, 
preserv es j in > i ii i,ai ilii Lit y : 
.. .we hold that when separate and distinct culpable acts are subsumed within a 
single com it... —any one of whicl t could support a conviction thereunder — and 
the defendant is ultimately convicted by a jury of the charged offense, the defen-
dant's constitutional right to a unanimous verdict is violated unless one or both 
of the following occurs; (1) at or before the * lose of its case-in-chief, the prosecu-
149
 United States v. league, 443 F.3d 1310,1317 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). 
150
 Utah Coi istitution, Article I sectioi 110 
151
 State v. Saum :k 7 s, 1 999 [ J 1 59 % 60 992 I ; 2d 951 (en if »1 lasis i u ided). 
152
 Id. at 1 64. 
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tion is required to elect the specific act upon which it is relying to establish the 
"conduct" element of the charged offense; or (2) the trial court gives the jury a 
specific unanimity instruction, i.e., an instruction that advises the jury that all 
twelve of its members must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.153 
In this case, the State created both factors jeopardizing jury unanimity. First, as ar-
gued above, Exploiting Prostitution can be committed through five actus reus alterna-
tives. Similarly, Utah's Pattern of Unlawful Activity Statute can be violated through at 
least three distinct actus reus alternatives: (1) & (2) by acquiring, maintaining an interest 
in, or operate an enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity or a pattern's 
proceeds; (3) by participating in an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful ac-
tivity; or (4) by conspiring to perform (1), (2), or (3). Second, the State argued that Mr. 
Maese violated the Exploiting Prostitution statute no fewer than 150 times.154 Despite 
these red flags, the trial court failed to protect Mr. Maese's jury unanimity right. 
A. The trial court failed to compel the State to elect offenses. 
When the State introduces evidence of more than one possible act constituting a 
charged criminal offense, the doctrine of election is implicated. Election of offenses re-
quires the State, compelled by the trial court, to submit to the jury specific acts recon-
ciled with specific counts for deliberation and verdict purposes. As articulated by the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, election of offenses serves numerous interests: 
it enables the defendant to prepare for the specific charge; it protects a defendant 
against double jeopardy; it enables the trial judge to review the weight of the 
evidence in its role as thirteenth juror; and it enables an appellate court to review 
the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The most important interest served by elec-
153
 State v. Arceo, 928 P.2d 843, 874-75 (Haw. 1996). 
154
 R. at 320 (Tr. 376:25, July 11, 2008.). 
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t l o n ^ h o w e v e r / i s to ensure that the ji irors deliberate over and render a veruict 
based on the same offense.155 
And while Utah's appellate courts last explicitly addressed the election doctrine 
Hilberg, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the State's failure to elect offenses: 
The trial court permitted the prosecution u introduce six distinct acts or crimes 
to be shown in evidence before the jury. . w ithout requiring any election to be 
made, and allowed the case to go to the jury upoi \ a; - i he several acts... Whether 
the jury united in a verdict upon each act, or SOTTM >-• *ne and others on another 
of the acts provod ;<-> problematical. 
No jury should be set to fishing or hunting for a charge which the\ are called 
upon to :s \ Such .-• course deprived the defendant of a fair trial and compelled 
him, without warning, to defend against acts of which he had no notice. Mani-
festly, he could not be prepared to meet such confusing charges not contained in 
the information.156 
h • - s •. s~-f i • - r. . ! •K ; \1 - Maese violated the Exploiting I 'rostit i ltioi 1 sta 
tute no fewer than 150 times157 yet charged him u ,th onlv tour counts. The State used a 
sin lilar argumei it regardii \j tei i i. ., .* .. • .\ ;uii ig tl tat 01 Lee \ 01 i fii itci 
three of these specific instances of unlawful conduct o> more — and we charged four — 
you then qualii \ * »v the pattern of unlawful activity..."158 Also it argued that "pattern 
of uiuav v -. ^-neaeir • *i, • 1: •. t • *E- -\ * * 
least three episodes''159 with the additional element of an enterprise. Yet like Exploiting 
155
 St;itc r. Bwiiii, w? c- H ?A: i.v», y ; - i t ! I 'N^I (citations omitted). 
156
 State v. Hilberg, 22 Utah 27, hi P 21 \ 2\h (Ltah 1900), 
157
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Prostitution, a Pattern of Unlawful Activity conviction can be sustained through any of 
three distinct actus reus elements. 
The State's case presentation satisfies the Hilberg criteria. And yet the trial court 
failed to require the State to elect which offenses it would submit to the jury. Necessari-
ly, the jury went fishing for the four discrete acts —and predicate episodes — they were 
called upon to try. This error invited a patchwork verdict160 and stole Mr. Maese's un-
waivable constitutional right to jury unanimity. 
B. The trial court's initial jury unanimity instruction miscommunicated Utah's 
jury unanimity principle. 
In State v. Cruz, the Utah Supreme Court validated reasonable doubt instructions by 
stating, "we need only ask whether the instructions, taken as a whole, correctly com-
municate the principle of reasonable doubt.. ,"161 This same simple question can be 
asked of jury unanimity instructions. 
Yet necessarily, jury unanimity instructions require more precision than reasonable 
doubt instructions. As the Utah Supreme Court noted in State v. Reyes, the English lan-
guage permits "many formulations for proof beyond a reasonable doubt that correctly 
convey its meaning/7162 But jury unanimity's specific definition —"unanimity as to a 
specific crime and as to each element of the crime"163 — cannot be accurately conveyed in 
myriad ways. Especially in this case. 
160 Trubitt, Patchwork Verdicts, Different-Jurors Verdicts, and American Jury Theory: Whether 
Verdicts are Invalidated by Juror Disagreement on Issues, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 473 (1983). 
161
 State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 21,122 P.3d 543 (quotations and citations omitted). 
162
 State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 20,116 P.3d 305. 
163
 State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 60, 992 P.2d 951 (emphasis added). 
~34~ 
A,s previously established the State cl larged Mr IV laese i u ider sii igi liar stati ites tl lat 
defined multiple crimes and presented evidence of a greater number of separate crimi-
i Lai offei ises tl lai 1.1: le was charged v » Itl i Despite tl: tis, tl te trial cc i irt Issued oi i l> a tw o 
sentence jury instruction regarding unanimity. Jury Instruction Ne 25 reads: 
25. REACHING A VERDICT This being a criminal case, your verdict must be 
unanimous; all jurors must agree. When you air all in agreement, then you have 
reached a verdict and \ our work is finished.l!l4 
While this Instruction generally advises the jury, it incorrectly states Utah law. lii-
struction 25 requires the jury to agree on guilt —the obvious binary choice in \ ordu t 
jury that its only purpose is to determine a vertiict Win MI the jury agrees on a venl^ t, 
their work is fii lished; yet tl te Uta I: i Supreme v om L M.IS held that it i- 'not enough 
that [the ji lry] simply unanimously agree oi igu.l! - • . . : ; . • * • . . - . • 
that Mr. Maese cannot be convicted except upon ]wr\ unanimity of even tactual ele-
11 tei it i Lecessary tc coi Lstiti it E:1 Exp loitii i,g I ^ rostit : • u . : • . :y 
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee illuminates the inherent dangers in 
providing a jury with a cursory unanimity instruction: 
_
 L o n v i c t ion that is not unanimous as to :.w oeienoant s specific illegal action 
is no more justifiable than a conviction by a jury that is not unanimous on a spe-
cific a)unt. Where the State presents evidence of numerous offenses, the trial 
court must augment the general jury unani n u t\ instruction to insure that the jury 
understands its duty to agree unanimous!} to a particular set of facts. A skeletal 
164
 R. at 284 (Jury I n s t r u c t s ! -v .. ^ .^wich^^ at ADDENDUMD). 
165
 State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, t 64, 992 P.2d 951. 
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jury instruction of unanimity ferments a strong possibility of a composite jury 
verdict in violation of an appellant's constitutional rights.166 
Here the State's case, predicated on numerous and diverse criminal theories, prevented 
Jury Instruction NQ 25 from accurately communicating Utah's jury unanimity law. 
1. This Court should address this jury instruction under plain error. 
Plain error occurs when "(i) an error was made; (ii) the error should have been obvious 
to the trial court; and (iii) the error was harmful, so that in the absence of the error, a 
more favorable outcome was reasonably likely/'167 The doctrine exists because, "Nei-
ther a counsel's nor a judge's error should be the cause of one's"168 conviction. 
Here, Mr. Maese failed to request a specific jury unanimity instruction. The Plain Er-
ror doctrine governs, however, because jury unanimity is "a right so fundamental that it 
may not be waived."169 Moreover, this case satisfies the plain error test. 
As argued above, an error was made; the jury instructions —particularly in this case 
where the trial court failed to compel the State to elect offenses — inaccurately commu-
nicate the law regarding jury unanimity. This error should have been obvious to the tri-
al court because the case law regarding jury unanimity is well settled; State v. Saunders 
was decided nearly a decade ago, State v. Russell more than 20 years ago, United State v. 
Gipson more than 30. Gross deviation from, or blindness to, stare decisis is obvious error. 
The last prong, a reasonably likely more favorable outcome, is established in several 
ways. Had a split jury— which apparently existed here as inferred by their written ques-
166
 State v. Neal, 2002 TN Crim App 76, 5-6 (unpublished) (Attached at ADDENDUM E). 
167
 State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, f 9, 9 P.3d 164. 
16
* State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,164 (Utah 1989). 
169
 United States v. league, 443 F.3d 1310,1317 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). 
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tioii aloi le beei t forced to recoi idle its differei ices it i i lay 1 ia\ e been i 11 table tc •; resi i lilt-
ing in a hung jury or acquittal. Alternatively, as articulated in his concurring opinion in 
State v. Tillman, justice Stewart v\ roh< that 
nonunanimity tends to subvert the proper operation of the lesser included of-
fense doctrine... because the jury may never have to consider that doctrine since 
it is not compelled to decide whether the defendant committed one or the other 
r ^oth5 alternative element^ in \]M definition < • h r r r m e ]70 
H e r e r.u- \vi ^  w a s p r e s e n t e d w Al\ A id ing 1'rostitution J-> Explo i t ing P ros t i t u t i on ' s 
l e s s * " ' . J- i • ' : • » • . „ • 
Under any alternative outcome theory — acquittal, hung jury, or conviction of lesser 
inch ided offenses 1"\ Ir I"\ laese s 01 itcc i ne / • ould certaii il> 1 i,a\ e beei 1.11 lore fa\ orable 
This case is analogous to United States v. Gipson, the original federal jury unanimity case. 
Ii i ti tat case "tl le fi: n ors ret i n i led to tl le ecu n tro - * : •> iditioi lal ii istri ictions 
from the court, handing the judge a note that reac > ur ,t ' n o . will he be guilty of 
all coui its or i \ ill it be brokei i. dc v • l it I "1 L ei: e ' I "1 le jt ldge ace i n atel) percei \ ed tl: lat 1:1 lis 
question could be interpreted in several different ways." 172 Here, the trial court did not. 
In this case the trial court received a question from the jury which asked: 
In instruction f* " ..-. • . .. . \ ail of them have to be fulfilled in order to i:i;a ;. i 
defendant guilty o i •..--! \ -ne-i *! the conditions met? Also the same question tor in-
struction #40.173 
170
 State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560 (U tah 1987) (Stewart , ] . , concu r r i ng ) . 
r
 United States v. Gvpson, ^ ^ I .Id 4:v>, 4r>- (^th i. i,, i*/ . ,. 
173
 R. a t 312, (Jury Q u e s t i o n No 1, a t t a c h e d a t ADDENDUM F). 
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The trial court instructed the jury with: 
Answer: Both Instructions 37 and 40's subparagraph (the a, b, c's) you refer to 
end with the word "or" and therefore should be read accordingly.174 
The Supplemental Instruction inaccurately conveyed Utah law. The Supplemental 
Instruction encouraged individual jurors to find Mr. Maese guilty of subsection (a) "or" 
(b) of both Pattern of Unlawful Activity (Instruction 37)175 and Exploiting Prostitution 
(Instruction 40).176 Because jury unanimity has a strict definition, the trial court should 
have instructed the jury that it must be unanimous as to: (1) which actus reus alternative 
Mr. Maese violated; as well as (2) what specific acts it relied upon in finding guilt. 
D. Mr. Maese's jury failed to be unanimous, but in misinterpreting Utah R. Evid 
606(b) the trial court barred juror statements. 
A guilty verdict that is not unanimous is not a true verdict. In State v. Saunders, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that when a jury agrees a defendant is guilty of crime, but the jury 
disagrees upon the specific crime or each element thereof, its unanimous guilty verdict 
fails to meet the Utah Constitution's requirements. 
For example, if a jury were given no elements instructions, a unanimous guilty 
verdict would not meet the requirements of Article I, section 10. Nor would a 
guilty verdict be valid if some jurors found a defendant guilty of robbery while 
others found him guilty of theft, even though all jurors agree that he was guilty of 
some crime. Nor would a verdict be valid if some jurors found a defendant guilty 
of a robbery committed on December 25,1990, in Salt Lake City, but other jurors 
found him guilty of a robbery committed January 15,1991, in Denver, Colorado, 
174
 R. at 312 (Supplemental Jury Instruction, Answer to Jury Question NQ 1, attached at 
ADDENDUM F). 
175
 R. at 294, (Instruction NQ 37 detailed Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603.). 
176
 R. at 297 (Instruction NQ 40 detailed Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305.). 
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even though all jurors found him guilty of the element , i L;u , ; ;me of roh "* rv 
and all the jurors together agreed that he was guilty nf ^ »nn» n *hbery.177 
If a jury agrees that some crime was committed, but disagrees upon which crime or 
w 1 ii :1 in, acts v v ere ci in 1.I1 lal tl leir \ erdict is ii Lvalid " I "1 leir \ erdict earn lot be a tri re \ erdi ::t; 
invalid, it is no verdict at all. 
1, Mr, Maese presents juror statements solely to establish that his jury failed to 
reach a true and valid verdict; the statements are therefore admissible. 
Utah -\u ;e of Evidence 606(b) states in relevant part: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testi-
fy as to any matter or statement oca irring during the course of the jury's delibe-
rations w fo the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or 
emotions a> influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict or in 
dictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith 178 
In State v. Gee, the Utah Supreme Court interpreted Utah R. Evid. 606(b). It wrote 
that testimony that the jury " [misunderstood] fact or law, or that they misunderstood 
the cl large of tl ue • :: :)i 11 t cur t l i,e effect of tl leii verdi ::t or ::: pii doi is surmises ai id processes 
of reasoning in arriving at a verdict"179 is precluded. 
\ et in this case, ]\ Ir. Maese sought to introuun. ; ^ : . ! IHI , , \ :;:..: .;.• ...:'\ t a ik j i- . 1 ^ . , 
a unanimous verdict. Accordingly, long-held law permits inquiry into verdicts that are 
untrue, even verdicts that at first glance are seemingly valid. The Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appea Is held that I ''eel R 1:;> i :l 606(b) pei 1 1 lits Ii iqi liries regarding vei c He i acci iracy: 
Rule 606(b) forbids a juror from testifying as to matters occurring during delibe-
rations or the juror's mental processes. I low ever we agree with the Second Cir-
177
 State v. Saunders, 1999 UT * } f60 992 P 2d 951 (1 ; n 1.];: >1 1, isrs , u 1< k ?d). 
1_sUtah R f vui ».i^r. ^>>- . 
179
 State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1972). 
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cuit that Rule 606(b), by its own terms, is silent as to queries designed to confirm 
the accuracy of the verdict, and that the rule therefore does not preclude a juror 
from testifying as to the potential miscommunication of the verdict.180 
Therefore a direct inquiry into the verdict, and its validity, alone is permissible. In 
Fox v. United States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed similar situations: 
By considering these affidavits, we do not impinge upon the rule that the affida-
vit of a juror may not be used to impeach a verdict which has been announced in 
open court. It has long been well settled that the affidavit of a juror is admissible 
to show the true verdict or that no verdict was reached at all.181 
The court lists four cases to support its position. 
Similarly under Utah law, Justice Stewart wrote that Utah R. Evid. 606(b) is not ab-
solute and "certainly verdicts are not absolutely inviolate. Verdicts based on chance or 
bribery, for example, have long been subject to challenge, since they do not even 
purport to be based on the law and the evidence."182 If juror statements show an invalid 
verdict, they are permissible evidence. 
2. Mr. Maese's juror statements prove that his jury failed to reach a unanimous 
verdict. 
Mr. Maese submitted juror interviews to the trial court which convincingly demonstrate 
his verdict was not unanimous and therefore no verdict was reached. 
On July 19, 2008, just days following the verdict in this case, Juror Dan Christensen, 
Juror Number 4, was interviewed. In that interview, he stated that the jury deliberated 
180
 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534,1548 (10th Cir. 1993). 
181
 Fox v. United States, 417 F.2d 84, 89 (5th Cir. 1969). 
182
 State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 85 (Utah 1988) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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for qi lite soi i t.e 1 in i Le a b c i i/l t l le speci fie acts tl ia1 • ma) have constituted the Exploiting 
Prostitution counts. Mr. Christensen said: 
And then there was also some confusion as to whether we had to agree on the 
same letter or if we could agree on different letters but still find each of them 
And then as far as A, I),and 1\ - it was kind of ;ike ^pl it across the room... like 
some people agree on A o*.n .* IMVP. i sure, some people agreed on D but weren't 
.sure, and some people agreed (MI I :HH W etvn't like, so there were some people 
who said yes on A.. R r .
 smd 1 . and then there w ere some members of the jury 
who said I well no I only feel B, C, I) and E. Some people felt like A was true and 
some people felt like D was tnu i Inn not necessarily both.183 
Mi ( Iirisliiiiiseiii alsuNinl lli.it ho '*.- • - fluf Mr. Maese shared in prostitution 
proceeds, but that other jurors did. I herefore some jurors believed Mr. Maese was 
guilu oi Lxpuniiri^ . i • *.ii, . * :^ . i . :. • •; *» < - • • t. 
On August 9, 2008, another juror, Tricia Odeneal, Juror Number 8, was interviewed. 
She said that the jury failed to agree upon which specific acts Mr. Maese performed that 
A jo la in I Mn I •» | ili nihil"' i ' l 'o'siittjtipp '. lalnli 
Q: So he necessarily exploited prostitution at least four times? 
.
 :>. .\i x- definiteh \i hi ,-UK. .on L;IO ;h... .;e was senciing OWL .I ;any 
basis, ot course. 
Q: Sure. Sure. But so } on Jidi •'! necessary — 
A: - ii Laudible 
183
 K at 352 (Motion lor An t•-! of Judgment at 30. Interview with Juror Dan Christian-
sen, conducted on July ! LK 2008 by Kelly Ann Booth.). 
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Q: You didn't necessarily agree on each of the counts that this was the beha-
vior that constituted this count, this was the behavior that constituted this 
count; you kind of took a more general and organic approach to it? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: Okay.184 
Still another juror, Shawn Meik, Juror Number 7, stated in his interview on August 
5, 2008 that the trial court instructed the jury to convict Mr. Maese of all four Exploiting 
Prostitution counts even if they believed he was guilty of only one count. 
Q: [Mr. Maese] knows he was convicted, but he doesn't know what conduct 
he was convicted of, and I was hoping you might talk to me a little bit 
about that. 
A: Well, can you be a little more specific? 
Q: Well, there were — there were four guilty verdicts on exploitation of prosti-
tution, and so I was hoping you could just say, like, on, you know, on the 
first count of that, we found that he was guilty because of this; on the 
second one, because of this; third, this; fourth this. 
A: I don't know a lot of details. The paperwork we were sent in the room with 
said that if he was found guilty of one, he was found guilty— he was found 
guilty of all four. 
Q: You say the paperwork you were sent in the room with said if what? 
A: That if he was found guilty on one of those counts, he was automatically 
guilty on all four. 
Q: Okay. I'm talking about specifically the exploitation of prostitution. 
A: Right. And that's what I'm talking about. There were four counts of that. 
Q: Gotcha.185 
184
 R. at 352-53 (Motion for Arrest of Judgment at 30-31. Interview with Juror Tricia 
Odeneal, conducted on August 9, 2008 by Shane Johnson.). 
~ 42 ~ 
1 • . . ' .»•. . .• M A ^ i \ \ i'hi mry failed to reach a 
unanimous verdict. While the reasoning behind nonunanimity — namely poor jury In-
structions—may be inadmi —.1 .* 
to render a true verdict, or that no verdict was reached at all, is admissible. These 
statements prove that Mr. Maese was convicted by a non-unanimous jury ve-
* * * 
Hi*1 SI tile's .iimii 11 In HIS isi'" ,ill< mv\J 11 in |in \ In ch< fosr I mm dn/iMis ni combinations of 
factual bases and legal theories to find Mr. Maese guilty of Exploiting Prostitution and a 
Pattern .*;. . . . u u \ u -=. :i- -t.-.i •• --uit • -
tween the evidence the State produced and the counts the jury convicted him on. Lour.; 
II could be a conviction for violating Exploiting Prostitution's subsection (n) rh\. nn.t v 
( -i InimJ suhso * * * 
v. i.;i« others found that (c) or id) w a^  \ ml ted. Likewise, each Exploiting Prostitution 
com n t T, i m. v. v ascribed to testin 1.01 i\ fron L ai t) 01 te w iti less 01 fron i. all of tl ten i 
Circumstances like these are why Utah s jury unanimity principle exists. In his State 
v. Tillman concurring opinion, Justice Stewart recognized that jury unanimity is syn-
on\ MIOUN H illi html Injil I !<• \\ arnrd 
if the principle of jury unanimity is relaxed, all the vaunted protections of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt will be threatened. Requiring juror unanimity as to 
the crime itself only, rather than each element of the crime, would permit a jury 
to render inconsistent and potentially irrational verdicts because they may be 
185
 R. 353-54 (Motion for Arrest of Judgment at 31-32. Interview with Juror Shawn Yleik, 
conducted on August 5, 2008 by Shane Johnson.). 
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based on conflicting and even inconsistent determinations of the facts. That is no 
small erosion of a fundamental principle of our criminal justice system.186 
Mr. Maese faced this very scenario; the State failed to elect offenses for specific 
charges and a jury convicted him based on conflicting and/or inconsistent factual de-
terminations. Contributing to this was an erroneous jury unanimity instruction which 
failed to correctly communicate the law; this error is obvious. Moreover, we know that 
Mr. Maese's jury was not unanimous because they have told us. The factual basis for 
the verdict is unexplained; which counts were ascribed to which acts, or that counts and 
acts were ascribed to particular subsections or even theories is unknown. 
POINT III. The evidence at trial failed to support at least three Exploiting Prostitu-
tion episodes; consequently, the State provided insufficient evidence of 
a Pattern of Unlawful Activity. 
After reviewing "the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light 
most favorable to the verdict,"187 the record shows that the State presented insufficient 
evidence to sustain Mr. Maese's convictions. 
A. When comparing the specifics of the crimes charged in Mr. Maese's Informa-
tion to the evidence the State adduced at trial, fatal variance exists. 
The notice the State provides a defendant binds it to the specific facts it alleges.188 This 
doctrine, variance, is based in constitutional due process.189 In State v. Burnett, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that material "variance between the specifics of the crime charged 
186
 State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 560 (Utah 1987) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
187
 State v. Honie, 2002 UT 4, f 44, 57 P.3d 977. 
188
 See Generally, State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260 (Utah 1985); McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 
321 (Utah 1983); State v. Myers, 302 P.2d 276, (Utah 1956). 
189
 State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,1215 n. 10 (Utah 1987). 
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ii it. 1 i le inforn latioi t. ai ltd 1 I t.e ci in ie of wh ich the court permit[s] the jury to convict"1 9 0 re-
quires reversal In State v. Marcum, the Utah Supreme Court wrote, "A variance is ma-
terial i f it actually prejudices t! ie accused \ • itl 11 esp ?ct t :» a si lbstantial i igl in...I:: :)T I \ 1 tere 
the informat ion is so defective that it resul ts in a iiiiscarriage of just ice/ ' 1 9 1 Fur thermore , 
in State v. Fulton the U t a h S u p r e m e Cour t wro te : 
It w o u l d be a mockery of the const i tut ional r ights of defendant to al low the state 
to falsely state the par t iculars of the offense charged a n d then . . . obtain a convic-
tion founded on said evidence.1 9 2 
Here the n v . -s\i shows a mater ia l —and const i tut ionally fatal —variance be tween the 
Inl'ii -• *• - • •. M r ^ i l i i H i ' i .m i l l l l i i , i i l i ' l l u • 1«11 lm n ) , ] | lii t.tl \ l i n o s i e \ r ! l j s l \ e l \ , 
the State in t roduced evidence of actus rci that vastly d iverged from its Information 's fac-
tual, al legations. As detailed »ii\-\ i., the A m e n d e d ;:K •„. . • .- ** •-.:.»* 
Sta tement e n u m e r a t e d cr imes from tvvo witnesses , D.T. a n d N . l . Vet, a^ part ial l) J c 
tailed below, the State in t roduced evidence of instances where : 
• • l i ' lh w ,'is i i i j i l n I lit nil 's- ill'1- | tn \\\\ . i l leging se\u,t l . t r t i \ ih ,193 
• A:i escort \ \cb told she charged !•>» ak h . N 4 
• Fictionalized tales of escorts per forming sex acts were wri t ten on the 
Internet.1 9 5 
• .,/ \.i i escort told 1\ Ir. Maese she w a s raped, by a client.196 
190
 State v. Burnett, 712 P.2d 260, (Utah 1985). 
191 c „ „ , ; , . ,
 ( „ f ; , ^ 
192
 State v. Ful ton ' L i / J " * ^ i •• v \ 1L^, , (citation omit ted) . 
193
 R. at 31L* . i : i 0D, 1 h-23, July 10, 2008.). 
1 9 4 ] • .: H1 ' : r> .<•:;: •.- \ * 12008.) . 
195
 l .it > ! - ! - i : « " - , 1 . 
1 9 6K at32lM'Ir. l7U:r>-I71:22|u]\ i i 2lH)S.j. 
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The State omitted these allegations from the Information and Probable Cause State-
ment. When Mr. Maese failed to receive a bill of particulars, his defense became predi-
cated on the theory that the factual allegations against him failed to constitute criminal 
acts. That theory is true and correct. These instances, and all other evidence — outside 
testimony relating to D.T. and N.F. — fail to establish the crimes articulated in the State's 
Information. Moreover, the State failed to introduce evidence of the essential elements 
and attendant circumstances required to sustain criminal convictions. 
B. The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain convictions on four Ex-
ploiting Prostitution alternatives. 
In presenting its case, the State " carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt each element of an offense.. ."197 And while circumstantial evidence alone can be 
sufficient to satisfy this burden, a jury conviction grounded exclusively in circumstan-
tial evidence must be examined to decide: 
(1) whether there is any evidence that supports each and every element of the 
crime charged, and (2) whether the inferences that can be drawn from that evi-
dence have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove 
each legal element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is 
not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or 
speculative possibilities of guilt.198 
Here, the State failed to present elements required to satisfy three alternatives of Ex-
ploiting Prostitution. Of the remaining alternatives, multiple convictions cannot be en-
tered; one as a matter of law, the other because of testimony at trial. Therefore, the four 
Exploiting Prostitution convictions are erroneous. 
197
 State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, | 45,192 P.3d 867 (quotations and citations omitted). 
198
 State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 344 (Utah 1997). 
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1 A I.1 \ IHVM' tint uo\ i*ith tin inmate* for ti invite of prostitution. 
As described above, Utah 's Exploiting Prostitution. statute pu*; wo\> : .-• i v.iw: • u ; ni-
r\M t : ij r t : .;rai h a - reads as follows: 
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of prostitu-
tion for one w ho would be an inmate;199 
Pi ii tl le1 1 * u i1 - i 1 rtal it. Code defii les "1 1.01 lse of prostiti ition" ai id " inmate" as: 
"House of prost i tut ion" means a place where prostitution * u promotion »>f 
prosti tut ion is regularly carried on b\ om- M more persons under the con-
1.n i management , or supervision of another. 
(.. ' inmate" means a person who engage - * • 1. * .in-: 11 or thr 01 1 gh the 
agency of a house of prostitution.200 
These legal definitions were recited to the jury via Jury Instructions NQ 38 and N° 40. 
But cei itral to I I01 is* "i i * : * 1 • :e referred tc is 
physical premises (versus ju 1 \ business ). 1 his definition is consistent with the o p i -
nion usage * *i \ 1 - .. -.< i •; :.'i * :.;.,:.* ..:•«.. t .a 11 v ase law as w ell I "he 1 \ n lericai 11 lei itage 
D i c t i o n a r y defines "house of prostitution" as: 
n At1 establishment ii1 v\ hich the services of prostitutes are available on the 
premises.2 0 1 
1 \.ddif ioi tally , I Jtah's case law describes houses of prosti tut ion occurring in a hotel ii \ 
Ogden,2 0 2 a trailer house on U. S. Highway 91, 2 0 3 and a dance hall in Ely, Nevada.2 0 4 
199
 Utah Code Ann $ 7h-10-1 W ( 1 ) (2006). 
200 i -
 t . t . , , 
:>
 'house oi prostitutioi ic American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, 
Fourth Edition. Houghton Mifflin Companv r 2004. 03 Jan. 2009. <Dictionary.com 
ht tp: / /dict ionary.reference.com/hn»w >(\'hoi ; ^ «.* rr.- , , l ' : ' v " 
202
 State v. Tacconi 171 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1946). 
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All definitions reference physical locations —premises —where prostitution or pro-
motion of prostitution occur with customers traveling to the respective locations. Fur-
thermore, the legislature distinguished "a house of prostitution" from "a prostitution 
business"205 in Code. Statutory construction rules require that the two definitions differ. 
This definition, house of prostitution as a place, is further supported by the common 
usage of the word inmate. The American Heritage Dictionary defines "inmate" as: 
n. A resident of a dwelling that houses a number of occupants, especially a per-
son confined to an institution, such as a prison or hospital.206 
To define "inmate" merely as a prostitute is repugnant to both its plain and legal de-
finitions. An inmate is defined by a house of prostitution. The house of prostitution is 
defined by a place. An inmate without a premises or house is a merely prostitute. 
The Doll House Escorts was a business which sent escorts to multiple locations 
throughout Utah.207 The Doll House was not a "house of prostitution" as defined by 
statute, jury instruction, or common usage. Accordingly, Mr. Maese could not be con-
victed for recruiting prostitutes for a nonexistent house of prostitution. 
Moreover, trial testimony failed to establish that Mr. Maese recruited prostitutes at 
all. To the contrary, Tiffany Curtis testified that neither she nor Mr. Maese required es-
203
 State v. Woodall, 305 P.2d 473,474 (Utah 1956). 
204
 Crellin v. Thomas, 247 P.2d 264, 265-66 (Utah 1952). 
205
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(e). 
206
 "inmate." The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. 08 Jan. 2009. <Dictionary.com 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/inmate>. 
207
 Trial testimony references the word "send" and "sent" on appointments 37 times. 
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corts to perform sex acts.208 They refrained from discussing sex acts because they didn't 
want escorts "to think that these guys were going to be aggressive with them."209 
The remaining witnesses7 testimony proves Mr. Maese failed to procure Inmates for 
a House of Prostitution. 
Allyson Jensen testified that Mr. Maese was present for her interview210 but Allyson 
offered no additional testimony about her interview. 
Jennifer Harris testified that Tiffany Curtis interviewed her, and Mr. Maese was not 
present at any time.211 On cross-examination, Jennifer was asked directly "did Mr. 
Maese ever tell you that as part of your condition of employment you would have to 
have sex?" to which she replied, "No."212 
Heather Twede testified that Mr. Maese was present for her interview213 but that 
"Nothing was really required except that we had to wear a dress and heels I think and it 
consisted of, you know, maybe dancing."214 
Danielle Thomas testified that Mr. Maese was present for the latter portion of her in-
terview with The Doll House.215 Yet when asked if sexual activity was required of her, 
Danielle said "No escort service in their right mind is really going to tell you up front 
208
 R. at 319 (Tr. 114:7-11, July 10, 2008.). 
209
 R. at 319 (Tr. 73:24-25, July 10, 2008.). 
210
 R. at 319 (Tr. 121:10-17, July 10, 2008.). 
211
 R. at 320 (Tr. 146:6-8, July 11, 2008.). 
212
 R. at 320 (Tr. 159:22-25, July 11, 2008.). 
213
 R. at 320 (Tr. 164:10-16, July 11, 2008.). 
214
 R. at 320 (Tr. 166:2-4, July 11, 2008.). 
215
 R. at 320 (Tr. 177:10-19, July 11, 2008.). 
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you need to have sex. I had already been doing it for five years so I kind of already 
knew what was going on."216 
Heather May Wright testified that Mr. Maese was present at her interview,217 but 
neither the State nor Mr. Maese asked additional questions regarding the interview. 
Nicole Fernandez testified that Tiffany Curtis contacted her about working for The 
Doll House218 but did not indicate that she was formally interviewed. Her testimony 
indicated that Mr. Maese "just wanted to make sure that I had the looks to do the [ba-
chelor] party... [and] He just asked if I wanted to do it and if Fd done parties before and 
I told him yes."219 
Plus, Exploiting Prostitution's subsection (a), through the word "procures," requires 
an intentional mens rea. Regardless of whether these witnesses eventually prostituted 
themselves, the State failed to prove that Mr. Maese intentionally obtained Inmates for a 
House of Prostitution. Mr. Maese freely admitted to placing ads in various media and 
participating in interviews for legal and licensed escorts.220 This greatly differs from 
purposely recruiting prostitutes, much less Inmates, for a House of Prostitution. 
Because the State failed to introduce evidence that The Doll House was a House of 
Prostitution, or that Mr. Maese recruited Inmates, as a matter of law under Exploiting 
Prostitution's subparagraph (a), Mr. Maese could not be convicted. 
216
 R. at 320 (Tr. 181:11-14, July 11, 2008.). 
217
 R. at 320 (Tr. 209:22-25, July 11, 2008.). 
218
 R. at 320 (Tr. 231:8-10, July 11, 2008.). 
219
 R. at 320 (Tr. 232:13-17, July 11, 2008.). 
220
 R. at 320 (Tr. 307:13-20; Tr. 269:19-271:17, July 11, 2008). 
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2. As a matter of law, Mr. Maese did not encourage, induce, or otherwise purposely 
cause anyone to become or remain a prostitute. 
As described above, Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute prohibits five discrete crimi-
nal acts; subsection (b) reads as follows: 
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become or re-
main a prostitute;221 
Utah law has long held that encouraging someone to become or remaining a prosti-
tute refers to a change in status; not encouraging individual prostitution acts. Specifical-
ly in State v. Gates, the Utah Supreme Court explored the meaning of nearly identical 
language —the pandering statute at the time —and concluded that, "the meaning of that 
term is that the other person attempt or try to persuade her to change her course of 
life."222 This construction, with prostitute as status, dates to at least 1912.223 To "become 
a prostitute" is also referenced in dicta, as status, as recently as 2006 and throughout 
multiple cases.224 This interpretation is also consistent with Aiding Prostitution's con-
trast; a person is guilty of Aiding Prostitution if he "procures or attempts to procure a 
prostitute for a patron."225 
No testimony exists that Mr. Maese encouraged anyone to change their status from 
nonprostitute to prostitute. Additionally, no testimony was introduced where Mr. 
Maese was confronted by an employee contemplating reversion to nonprostitute from 
221
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). 
222
 State v. Gates, 221 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah 1950). 
223
 State v. Topham, 123 P. 888 (Utah 1912). 
224
 In re O.D., 2006 UT App 382, f 3,145 P.3d 1180; State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347 (Utah 1951). 
225
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304(b). 
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prostitute; Mr. Maese could not have encouraged someone to continue in their prosti-
tute status. Mr. Maese's statements and actions fail to meet the statute's requirements. 
3. The State failed to introduce evidence that an understanding existed between Mr, 
Maese and any prostitute where he was to share in proceeds of prostitution, or 
that he received any proceeds from prostitution. 
As described above, Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute prohibits five discrete crimi-
nal acts; subsection (d) reads as follows: 
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute share the proceeds of 
prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding that he is to 
share therein;226 
Utah Code states that Mr. Maese is "presumed to be innocent until each element of 
the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt" and, "In absence 
of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted."227 Integral to this Exploiting Prostitu-
tion alternative is evidence of an understanding, an attendant circumstances and an 
element of the offense.228 The State's evidence has two deficiencies here. 
First, a conviction under this Exploiting Prostitution alternative would create a re-
pugnant verdict when contrasted with the jury's Money Laundering acquittal. Under 
Utah law, Money Laundering encompasses all proceeds of any kind received from any 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602 enumerated crime; prostitution is listed there. 
Next, the State failed to prove that an understanding between prostitutes and Mr. 
Maese existed where he was to share in proceeds from prostitution; and that he actually 
shared in those profits. The State proved that escorts were required to collect $145 from 
226
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). 
227
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501(1). 
228
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-501 (2)(a) (2008). 
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clients; $95 going to the company and $50 to the escort.229 Additionally, all witnesses 
agreed that clients generally engaged in two contracts: one which required escorts to 
show up and fully disrobe followed by a second and separate contract where escorts 
negotiated with clients for any additional services.230 The Doll House had specific un-
derstandings with each witness. It would share in monies from the initial contract 
which required their presence only. Specifically, it disclaimed any proceeds from sub-
sequent contracts, regardless of what services the escort contracted for and provided.231 
Therefore, the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction 
against Mr. Maese under Exploiting Prostitution's subsection (d). 
4. The State failed to introduce evidence that The Doll House was a House of Prosti-
tution or a Prostitution Business. 
As described above, Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute prohibits five discrete crimi-
nal acts; subsection (e) reads as follows: 
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in associa-
tion with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business.232 
Here, Mr. Maese acknowledged that he was partner in The Doll House.233 Yet, as es-
tablished above, The Doll House was not a house of prostitution. Therefore, The Doll 
House must meet the definition of a "prostitution business/' Utah Code fails to provide 
229
 R. at 319 (Tr. 88:17-21, July 10, 2008.). 
230
 R. at 319-320 (Tr. 105:22-106:1, July 10, 2008; Tr. 148:14-149:11, Tr. 166:20-167:3, Tr. 
200:10-201:6, Tr. 220:21-221:12, Tr. 240:25-241:16, July 11, 2008.). 
231
 R. at 319-320 (Tr. 88:22-89:5, Tr. 105:13-21, Tr. 136:1-15, July 10, 2008; Tr. 149:20-150:1, 
Tr. 175:1-7, Tr. 182:4-14, July 11, 2008.). 
232
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). 
233
 R. at 320 (Tr. 293:1-2, July 11, 2008.). 
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a legal definition for Prostitution Business. Therefore, defining Prostitution Business by 
the fair import of the word provides some help.234 The word "business" is defined as: 
1. an occupation, profession, or trade: His business is poultry farming. 
2. the purchase and sale of goods in an attempt to make a profit. 
3. a person, partnership, or corporation engaged in commerce, manufacturing, 
or a service; profit-seeking enterprise or concern.235 
These ordinary meanings support a criminal definition of The Doll House selling prosti-
tution. Yet the State failed to introduce evidence that The Doll House sold prostitution. 
The Doll House sold fully-nude companionship in one hour increments. Certainly 
The Doll House was a Sexually Oriented Business; its services were sexual by nature. 
Yet those services are State sanctioned and Mr. Maese specifically created constructs to 
prevent The Doll House's services from devolving to illegal activities. 
Additionally, as previously detailed, because The Doll House customers contracted 
separately with individual escorts for services beyond companionship, The Doll House 
never received profits from prostitution. Undisputedly, The Doll House received $95 
from nearly every appointment performed. Yet that money was received regardless of 
whether or not escorts engaged in prostitution activities.236 
The Doll House generated profits only from the initial contract, regardless of wheth-
er escorts successfully negotiated secondary contracts. Jennifer Harris testified that 50% 
234
 See Utah R. Crim. P. 4(h) (2008). 
235
 business. Dictionary.com. Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Random House, Inc. 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/business (accessed: January 18, 2009). 
236
 R. at 319 (Tr. 88:17-21, July 10, 2008.). 
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of her appointments involved illegal sexual activity;237 necessarily, 50% of her appoints 
failed to involve illegal sexual activity. Therefore, as testified to explicitly by Mr. Maese 
and implicitly by others, the purpose of collecting "agency fees" upfront, before escorts 
entered into further negotiations with clients, was so that the company was paid despite 
customers learning that they would not receive sex acts.238 
Accordingly, The Doll House was not a prostitution business and the State failed to 
introduce evidence that Mr. Maese Exploited Prostitution under this subsection. 
C. The State's evidence at trial for the remaining Exploiting Prostitution alter-
natives was inherently improbable. 
In State v. Robbins, the Utah Supreme Court held that, "A conviction not based on sub-
stantial reliable evidence cannot stand"239 and that "the definition of inherently im-
probable must include circumstances where a witness's testimony is incredibly dubious 
and, as such, apparently false."240 Importantly, using this standard, the Court men-
tioned an Iowa case that was overturned based on "witnesses who had motive to lie."241 
1. The State s only instance of Mr. Maese transporting a person to promote prosti-
tution relied upon Nicole Fernandez s inherently improbable testimony. 
As described above, Utah's Exploiting Prostitution statute prohibits five discrete crimi-
nal acts; subsection (c) provides: 
237
 R. at 320 (Tr. 151:18-21, July 11, 2008.). 
238
 R. at 320 (Tr. 274:11-275:17, July 11, 2008.). 
239
 State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f 14 (quotations and citations omitted). 
240
 Id. at If 18. 
241
 Id. at 1 20. 
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(c) transports a person into or within this state with a purpose to promote that 
person's engaging in prostitution or procuring or paying for transportation 
with that purpose;242 
Nicole Fernandez" substantive trial testimony regarded a specific appointment, her 
first as a Doll House escort. Her testimony at trial regarding this material event dramat-
ically contradicted her testimony at the preliminary hearing. Fernandez's testimony at 
both events contradicted her prior statements to police, which exonerated Mr. Maese. 
Although no other witness testified that Mr. Maese transported them, Fernandez tes-
tified that Mr. Maese drove her to her first appointment. At this appointment, she testi-
fied that Mr. Maese told her the client regularly tips Doll House escorts $400.m Yet at 
preliminary hearing, she testified that it was the client who told her he regularly tips es-
corts $200.2U (Fernandez testified at trial and at preliminary hearing that this client re-
quested sexual intercourse but would not meet Fernandez7 $800 asking price.245) 
Fernandez continued by testifying that she eventually came to terms with the client 
and provided manual and oral sex for $400, but the client was unhappy with this and 
called Mr. Maese to complain.246 At preliminary hearing, Fernandez testified that she 
had sexual intercourse with the client for $200 because she didn't want Mr. Maese to 
think she was a "flake." In this version, the satisfied customer failed to complain.247 
242
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1) (2006). 
243
 R. at 320 (Tr. 234:17-22, July 11,2008.). 
244
 R. at 81 (Tr. 72:20-73:3, April 3, 2007.). 
245
 R. at 320 (Tr.235:8-12, July 11, 2008); R. at 81 (Tr. 72:20-73:3, April 3, 2007.). 
24
* R. at 320 (Tr. 235:22-236:4, July 11, 2008.). 
247
 R. at 81 (Tr. 73:4-13, April 3, 2007.). 
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At trial, Fernandez testified that she and Mr. Maese arranged for Mr. Maese to drop 
her off at this appointment and that she would call him to come pick her up when the 
appointment concluded.248 At the preliminary hearing, Fernandez testified that Mr. 
Maese waited for her outside throughout the appointment.249 
At trial, Fernandez testified that she "had sex with all of [her Doll House clients]/7250 
At the preliminary hearing, she testified that she had sex with about half of them.251 Yet 
in her police interview she claimed that she never had sex with Doll House clients.252 
This version is supported by the State's Probable Cause Statement which states that she 
"was not given many appointments because she would not have sex with clients."253 
Prior to trial, the State was well aware of Fernandez' wildly inconsistent accounts. 
She was initially emphatic to investigating officers that she never prostituted herself 
with Doll House clients, but prostituted herself with her personal clients exclusively. 
She was asked "Did you ever have sex with any of their clients?" and she replied "Not 
theirs, no... I had sex with a few of my own.. ,"254 At trial, she stated "I've seen so many 
clients, I don't remember who I did."255 From the same police interview she said "I hate 
him [Mr. Maese], he's a little fucker, you know, and even on bad people I don't wish 
248
 R. at 320 (Tr. 234:23-235:2, July 11, 2008.). 
249
 R. at 81 (Tr. 73:15-17, April 3, 2007.). 
250
 R. at 320 (Tr. 240:19-21, July 11, 2008.). 
251
 R. at 81 (Tr. 74:18-24, April 3, 2007.). 
252
 R. at 320 (Tr. 245:5-25, July 11, 2008.) 
253
 R. at 11 (Probable Cause Statement at | 5 , § a.). 
254
 R. at 320 (Tr. 245:7-12, July 11, 2008.). 
255
 R. at 320 (Tr. 245:24-25, July 11, 2008.). 
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bad things but I just wish you know, I'll tell you so that he can get his everything gone" 
Fernandez acknowledged that she "remember [ed] saying a few words out of anger, I 
do, yeah."256 She only later agreed to provide contrary damaging testimony against Mr. 
Maese in exchange for a plea-in-abeyance on an unrelated criminal charge.257 
When asked about the contradictions regarding prostitution in her testimony, Fer-
nandez replied "If I answered any of the questions like that to the cops it's because I 
thought they were going to try and charge me with more stuff." That answer alone, 
however, demonstrates her testimony's inherent improbability. If Fernandez was afraid 
that the police would charge her with prostitution for sexual activity with clients, she 
would have denied prostituting herself with her own clients as well as Doll House 
clients. Furthermore, she testified that she failed to remember exactly whom she "did;" 
this negates her recollection of events transpiring between her and Mr. Maese. Finally, 
her recollection and motivation from a police interview conducted before the start of 
trial would necessarily support that she was honest at that time. 
On many crucial details, Fernandez' trial testimony is at complete odds with her 
preliminary hearing testimony. And her testimony in both venues contradicts her prior 
statements to police and the testimony given by all of the State's other witnesses. These 
direct lies and contradictions display Nicole Fernandez's testimony's inherent improba-
bility; her uncorroborated testimony was blatantly false.258 
256
 R. at 320 (Tr. 248:20-249:3, July 11, 2008.). 
257
 R. at 320 (Tr. 251:22-252:6, July 11, 2008.). 
258
 A text of Nicole Fernandez's complete police interview is found at R. at 524-86; her 
preliminary hearing testimony is found at R. 81 (Tr. 66:1-90:20, April 3, 2007); and 
her trial testimony is found at R. 320 (Tr. 230:10-252:22, July 11, 2008). 
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D. The State failed to prove Mr. Maese violated a Pattern of Unlawful Activity. 
As described above, Mr. Maese was charged with violating specific sections of Utah's 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity statute. The sections he was charged with read as follows: 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived, 
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity... to use 
or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that income... in the acquisition 
of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to ac-
quire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any en-
terprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the con-
duct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.259 
Here, the State failed to prove the three predicate episodes — episodes limited to the 
charged conduct contained with the Information.260 — required by a Pattern of Unlawful 
Activity's definition.261 Beyond that failure, the State failed to prove a nexus between a 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity and an enterprise as required by the law. 
The State failed to introduce any evidence that Mr. Maese used profits from Exploit-
ing Prostitution to acquire, establish, or operate any enterprise; it failed to introduce any 
evidence that Mr. Maese acquired or maintained, either directly or indirectly, any inter-
est in or control of any enterprise through Exploiting Prostitution. Finally, the State 
failed to introduce any evidence that Mr. Maese directly or indirectly conducted or par-
ticipated in any enterprise's affairs through Exploiting Prostitution. 
259
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603. 
260
 R. at 9 ("...as indicated in Counts TWO through FIVE of this Information."). 
261
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(2) (2006). 
~ 5 9 ~ 
E. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Maese acted 
with the required mens rea. 
The trial court failed to instruct the jury regarding the mens rea required for Exploiting 
Prostitution and Pattern of Unlawful Activity, yet statutory construction and legal 
precedent demonstrate that the mens rea for both is purposeful. 
Each Exploiting Prostitution subsection articulates an intentional mens rea wherein it 
states, "(a) ...procures... or places an inmate... (b) otherwise purposely causes... (c) 
transports... with a purpose to promote... prostitution... (d) shares the proceeds of 
prostitution... pursuant to their understanding that he is to share therein... (e) owns, 
controls, manages, or otherwise keeps"262; furthermore, "the gist of the offense of 'keep-
ing a house of ill fame7 [Subsection (e)'s predecessor] is the management, control and 
operation of it."263 
Despite Exploiting Prostitution requiring intentional mens rea, the prosecutor ac-
knowledged in his closing that the evidence he introduced proved only knowledge: 
This is money coming in for prostitution and he knows it. We've established 
knowledge.264 
Now again, we have to show knowledge and the evidence as it's come in shows 
knowledge.265 
Knowledge. The State had the burden of showing knowledge, knowledge on the 
part of the defendant of what was taking place with his escorts. 266 
262
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). 
263
 State v. Davie, 240 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1952) (internal quotations added). 
264
 R. at 320 (Tr.354:6-7, July 11, 2008.). 
265
 R. at 320 (Tr. 350:8-9, July 11, 2008.). 
266
 R. at 320 (Tr. 345:8-10, July 11, 2008.). 
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Here's your specific incidents of conduct that describes both the knowledge that 
the defendant has...267 
Do you think the defendant has knowledge when he edits this letter and sends it 
to the mother of one of his employees?268 
She told them about it, there's your knowledge, and they still took that agency 
fee despite what had happened.269 
Although the State argued the incorrect standard to the jury — explaining why the jury 
felt justified in convicting Mr. Maese —the evidence showed that Mr. Maese could have 
known that escorts working for The Doll House had engaged in prostitution; though 
only through after-the-fact accounts from escorts.270 But the State failed to prove Mr. 
Maese knew escorts would prostitute themselves prior to any appointment. Mr. Maese 
advertised for and hired people to work as escorts for The Doll House and escorts were 
never required to engage in prostitution.271 This demonstrates that he failed to employ 
escorts for the purpose —and intent —that they engage in prostitution. The evidence 
demonstrated that Mr. Maese edited and sent a letter to Alyson Jensen's mother which 
alleged that she had engaged in prostitution.272 The letter shows that Mr. Maese knew 
that Jensen prostituted herself.273 Yet the letter cannot provide a temporal reference to 
267
 R. at 320 (Tr. 348:15-19, July 11, 2008.). 
268
 R. at 320 (Tr. 349:19-21, July 11, 2008.). 
269
 R. at 320 (Tr. 352:12-14, July 11, 2008.). 
270
 R. at 319-20 (Tr. 87:14-88:16, July 10, 2008; Tr. 236:1-4, July 11, 2008.). 
271
 R. at 320 (Tr. 146:13-17, Tr. 263:4-10, Tr. 269:19-24, Tr. 270:16-18, July 11, 2008.). 
272
 R. at 320 (Tr. 286:19-21, July 11, 2008.). 
273
 STATE'S EXHIBIT 30. 
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show that (1) Mr. Maese knew she prostituted herself while working for The Doll 
House and (2) then used that knowledge to commit a crime. 
The evidence is insufficient to prove Mr. Maese acted with any mens rea greater than 
knowledge and Exploiting Prostitution fails to provide a crime with that intent. 
* * * 
The State presented insufficient evidence to sustain the charges against Mr. Maese for 
three reasons. First, the evidence introduced at trial contained fatal variances from Mr. 
Maese's Information and Probable Cause Statement. Second, the State failed to prove vi-
tal Exploiting Prostitution elements, virtually ignoring Exploiting Prostitution's atten-
dant circumstances. Finally, the State failed to prove the charged crimes mens rea 
element. Accordingly, the convictions against Mr. Maese should be vacated. 
POINT IV. The trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding Pattern of Un-
lawful Activity's charged elements; a fatal variance from the informa-
tion. This allowed the jury to convict Mr. Maese of an uncharged 
Pattern of Unlawful Activity alternative. 
Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states in relevant part that "[a]n in-
dictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is being prose-
cuted by... statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient 
to give the defendant notice of the charge/'274 And in discussing what constitutes a va-
lid information, this Court held that "the information provided to [the Defendant] con-
tained the charge [], the name of the victim, the date and place of the crime, and the 
relevant text of the [] statute."275 This rule solidifies the Utah Constitution's guarantees 
2 7 4UtahR.Crim.P.4(b). 
275
 State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, t i l , 56 P.3d 969. 
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that an accused may know "the nature and cause of the accusation against him, [and] to 
have a copy thereof"276 and that these offenses "shall be prosecuted by information af-
ter examination and commitment by a magistrate."277 
The Information in Mr. Maese's case failed to charge Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603 
(4), the Pattern of Unlawful Activity Act's conspiracy alternative;278 the charges read by 
the trial court to the jury did not recite this subsection.279 That subsection provides: 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of Subsec-
tion (1), (2), or (3).280 
Yet Jury Instruction NQ 37 included the Conspiracy Alternative and stated: 
Before you can convict STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE [sic] of engaging in a pat-
tern of unlawful activity, as charged in the information, you must find... STEVEN 
SANTIAGO MAESE [sic], did commit an unlawful act or acts as defined: ... 
d. did conspire to commit any unlawful act as described in paragraphs a, b, or c 
above.281 
Although the Information contains the words "conspired" and "conspiracy," the State 
notified Mr. Maese only that it may consider conspiracy as an inchoate offense. The 
Conspiracy Alternative exists to elevate conspiring to violate Utah's Pattern of Unlaw-
276
 Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. 
277
 Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 13. 
278
 R. at 8-9. 
279
 R. at 838 (Tr. 6:12-7:17, July 10, 2008.). 
280
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603(4). 
281
 R. at 294 (Jury Instruction NQ 37.) (emphasis added). 
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ful Activity Act from an inchoate offense to a primary offense;282 allowing the State to 
charge conspiracy as a second degree felony instead of a third degree felony. 
In Orem City v. Martineau, this Court held that "well-established principles of statu-
tory construction require that a more specific statute governs instead of a more general 
statute."283 Therefore, in charging Mr. Maese under Pattern of Unlawful Activity's Con-
spiracy Alternative, the Amended Information is fatally defective and Jury Instruction 
NQ 37 is erroneous. In State v. Dunn the Utah Supreme Court held that, "The remedy for 
an erroneous jury instruction is a new trial."284 This error should have been obvious to 
the trial court. Moreover, because the State's evidence was largely conspiratorial, the in-
struction severely prejudiced Mr. Maese's defense by encouraging the jury to convict 
him under a statute subsection the State failed to charge him with. 
CONCLUSION 
All trials have errors, and Mr. Maese understands that he is entitled to a fair trial, not a 
perfect one. This Court, however, requires less than a preponderance of the evidence to 
show that if the errors addressed here had never taken place, the outcome would be dif-
ferent. This is because "thoughtful reflection suggests that confidence in the outcome 
may be undermined at some point substantially short of the 'more probable than not' 
282
 See generally Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-202, 76-4-301 (2008). 
283
 Orem City v. Martineau, 2006 UT App 136, f 6,135 P.3d 884 (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
284
 State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1229 (Utah 1993) (Stewart, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part). 
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portion of the spectrum/'285 Therefore, confidence in the verdict is undermined at some 
point substantially short of greater than fifty percent. 
The justice system has a "duty to ensure a fair trial."286 Because numerous errors af-
fecting Mr. Maese's substantial rights occurred, this Court's only avenue to ensure Mr. 
Maese receives a fair trial is to grant him a new one. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Maese respectfully requests this Court order his convictions va-
cated; or alternatively, reverse the trial court's judgment, and grant him a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 3rd day of June, 2009. 
S. Steven Maese 
Appellant Pro Se 
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Addendum A 
RULE 4 PROSECUTION OF PUBLIC OFFENSES. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which the defendant is 
being prosecuted by using the name given to the offense by common law or by 
statute or by stating in concise terms the definition of the offense sufficient to give 
the defendant notice of the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied 
by a statement of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the offense 
charged where appropriate. Such things as time, place, means, intent, manner, value 
and ownership need not be alleged unless necessary to charge the offense. Such 
things as money, securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments 
may be described by any name or description by which they are generally known or 
by which they may be identified without setting forth a copy. However, details 
concerning such things may be obtained through a bill of particulars. Neither 
presumptions of law nor matters of judicial notice need be stated. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to inform a 
defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to enable him to 
prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. 
The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such 
later time as the court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the 
filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or supplemented 
at any time subject to such conditions as justice may require. The request for and 
contents of a bill of particulars shall be limited to a statement of factual information 
needed to set forth the essential elements of the particular offense charged. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual meaning 
unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal meaning. 
RULE 12 MOTIONS. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for 
good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual 
issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the 
record. 
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests 
which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute 
waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
RULE 606 COMPETENCY OF JUROR AS WITNESS. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Article VI—Witnesses 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indictment. Upon an inquiry into the validity 
of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything 
upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to 
or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes 
in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether 
extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor 
may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning a matter 
about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these 
purposes. 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with Rules 41 and 44, Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971), and Utah case law, State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 
(1972). 
76-10-1301. DEFINITIONS. 
Title 76-Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 10 —Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals 
Section 1301 — Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "House of prostitution" means a place where prostitution or promotion of 
prostitution is regularly carried on by one or more persons under the control, 
management, or supervision of another. 
(2) "Inmate" means a person who engages in prostitution in or through the agency 
of a house of prostitution. 
(3) "Public place" means any place to which the public or any substantial group of 
the public has access. 
(4) "Sexual activity" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any sexual 
act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth or anus of another 
person, regardless of the sex of either participant. 
Amended by Chapter 199,1988 General Session 
76-10-1305. EXPLOITING PROSTITUTION. 
Title 76-Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 10 —Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals 
Section 1305 — Exploiting prostitution. 
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he: 
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of 
prostitution for one who would be an inmate; 
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become or 
remain a prostitute; 
(c) transports a person into or within this state with a purpose to promote that 
person's engaging in prostitution or procuring or paying for transportation 
with that purpose; 
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shares the proceeds of 
prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding that he is to 
share therein; or 
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business. 
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of the third degree. 
Amended by Chapter 1, 2000 General Session 
76-10-1603. UNLAWFUL ACTS. 
Title 76-Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 10 — Offenses Against Public Health, Safety, Welfare, and Morals 
Section 1603 - Unlawful acts. 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived, whether 
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the person 
has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of 
that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived from the 
investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the 
establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to acquire or 
maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to 
conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that 
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of Subsection 
(1), (2), or (3). 
Repealed and Re-enacted by Chapter 238,1987 General Session 
UTAH CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
Section 12. Rights of accused persons 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, 
to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put 
in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of 
that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless 
otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of 
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any 
preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by 
statute or rule. 
Section 13. Prosecution by information or indictment—Grand jury 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by 
information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination 
be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The formation of the grand jury and the 
powers and duties thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
Addendum B 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
CHAD L. PLATT, 8475 
Deputy District Attorneys 
111 East Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone:(801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
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Defendant. 
TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, 
Co-Defendant. 
Screened by: C. Piatt 
Assigned to: C. Piatt 
BAIL: PTS 
Warrant/Release: Summons / Surrender 
DAO# 6018158 
AMENDED 
I N F O R M A T I O N 
Case No. 061906590 
The undersigned, Detective D. Bartlett - Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Agency Case 
No 2006-28791, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the 
crimes of: 
COUNT I 
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a Second Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, attempted, conspired, solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or 
intentionally aided another to participate as a principal in a pattern of unlawful activity intending 
to receive directly or indirectly, proceeds derived from that pattern of unlawful activity to be 
invested in the acquisition of an interest in the establishment or operation of an enterprise 
contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, or 
did acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of an enterprise through a 
pattern of unlawful activity contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(2), Utah Code 
ORIGIN 
DAO#6018158 
Annotated, 1953 as amended, or did become persons employed by or associated with an 
enterprise intending to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the functions of the 
enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 
1603(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and committed an act or acts in the pursuance 
of such attempt or conspiracy; to-wit: between the dates of July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, 
the defendants did exploit prostitution in at least three separate episodes which are not isolated, 
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victim, or methods of commission, as 
indicated in Counts TWO through FIVE of this Information. 
NOTICE is given that the defendants' STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY 
FRENCH CURTIS, interest in any property or proceeds from the conduct prohibited in Count I 
is subject to forfeiture pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(5), 
1953 as amended. NOTICE is further given pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-10-1603.5 that the district 
attorney seeks the costs of investigating and prosecuting the offense described in Count I, to be 
paid by defendant, in lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law, and that the defendant be fined 
not more than twice the amount of the net proceeds derived from the conduct engaged in and 
prohibited by Section 76-10-1603. 
COUNT II 
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate 
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or 
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or 
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent 
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding 
that she was to share therein. 
COUNT III 
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate 
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or 
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or 
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent 
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding 
that she was to share therein. 
DAO# 6018158 
COUNT IV 
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate 
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or 
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or 
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent 
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding 
that she was to share therein. 
COUNT V 
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in 
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as 
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in 
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate 
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or 
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or 
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent 
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding 
that she was to share therein. 
COUNT VI 
MONEY LAUNDERING, a Second Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East and in and around 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in violation of 
Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1903, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the 
defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as party to 
the offense, did transport, receive, or acquired property which was in fact proceeds of unlawful 
activity, to wit: Exploitation of a Prostitute, knowing that the property involved represented the 
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, or made proceeds of unlawful activity available to 
another by transaction or transportation, or other means, knowing that it was intended to be used 
for the purpose of continuing or furthering the commission of specified unlawful activity. 
DAO# 6018158 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Detective D. Bartlett; Sgt. Paul Brenneman; witnesses N.F., A.F., H.T., H.R., J.H., D.T., 
T.N.,H.W.,M.H. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiant bases this information on the following: 
1. D House LLC, aka "Doll House" is a registered sexually oriented business 
("SOB") in Summit County, Park City. Doll House is not a registered SOB in any city within 
Salt Lake County. The registered owners of D House LLC are TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS 
("CURTIS") and STEVEN SANTIAGO MEESE ("MEESE"). 
2. In March of 2006, the Cottonwood Heights Precinct of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriffs Office received complaints that the residence located at 7567 South 2160 East, in Salt 
Lake County, was operating as an SOB, specifically, as the escort agency, Doll House. 
3. In March and April, 2006, Detective Dan Bartlett ("Bartlett") conducted trash-
covers at 7567 S. 2160 East. In both instances Bartlett discovered discarded customer names, 
addresses, and escort names on company letterhead, along with appointment dates and meeting 
times, consistent with an SOB being operated without an SOB license. 
4. In an investigation based upon names obtained from the trash covers, as well as 
the Doll House Web Site which contained a link to "theeroticreview.com" ("TER") - a website 
that gives reviews of escorts, written by patrons, Bartlett discovered hundreds of reviews on TER 
which describe specific sexual acts Doll House escorts have performed. 
5. Detective Bartlett conducted numerous interviews with current and past "escort" 
employees of the Doll House. Each interviewee describes an ongoing pattern by which MEESE 
and CURTIS aided and encouraged prostitution, and received the proceeds from the 
appointments. A non-exhaustive description of MEESE and CURTIS' activities as related by 
escorts follows: 
a. N.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between July and September of 
2005 stated taht MEESE would tell her when a customer was a "reg" (a regular) and would 
explain what likes the "reg" had, such as oral sex. N.F. describes one particular instance where 
MEESE ordered her to an appointment where the customer wanted sex. N.F. tried not to have 
sex, and the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then called N.F. and told her "B*tch, 
you're gonna have to make it work." N.F. states when she attempted to leave Doll House, 
MEESE threatened her. N.F. states she was not given many appointments because she would not 
have sex with clients. 
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b. A.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between October and Decemberl 
of 2005, states that MEESE threatened her if she did not continue working for Doll House. A.F. 
states CURTIS regularly encouraged good reviews on TER, and specifically encouraged bbbjj 
which is a term for oral sex without a condom. A.F. states that CURTIS made clear that if she! 
did not tip the phone girl, which was usually her self (the person that sets appointments), she 
would not get any more appointments. 
c. H.T., who worked as a Doll House escort between January and March of 
2006, states she did have sex with clients for money, and that she always paid CURTIS out at the 
cottonwood address following the appointments. H.T. states for the first four appointments, the 
entire $145.00 agency fee went to Doll House, plus 20% of any tips. H.T. states that not all 
customers received intercourse - approximately 1 in 8, but that manual sex was frequent and 
easy, approximately 7 in 8. 
d. H.R., who worked as a Doll House escort between September 2005 and 
February 2006, states that she did have intercourse with clients for money, but usually provided 
manual or oral sex because it was easy. H.R. states that MEESE and CURTIS told her that if she 
ever got arrested for prostitution, to not say anything, and they would provide a lawyer for her. 
e. J.H., who worked as a Doll House escort between November and 
December of 2005, states that MEESE told her they would pay for a lawyer if she would not talk 
to police. J.H. states that money was paid out to CURTIS and/or MEESE at the Cottonwood 
address every time. J.H. states that CURTIS told her that clients would ask for sex every time. 
J.H. states that she did have sex with men for money, and would pay CURTIS 20% of the tips. 
J.H. describes as an example one occasion being paid $1,000 for an appointment where she had 
sex, paying out $100 for the "agency fee" and then an additional $200 to CURTIS as a tip. 
f. D.T., who worked as a Doll House escort between April and May of 2006, 
[states that she was sent on 3 to 4 dates per day in the beginning. D.T. states that she would have 
sex for money while working for the Doll House. D.T. describes on one particular occasion 
being asked by a customer to have sexual intercourse for $200.00 without a condom. When D.T. 
refused, the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then got on the phone and told D.T. 
ito drive down the hill and get condoms and go back and "work something out." 
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g. T.N., who worked as a Doll House escort for approximately one year 
between 2005 and 2006, states that in practice the girls frequently told CURTIS and MEESE of 
the specific sex acts they perform, and that they are required to tip 20% of the "tip" received by 
customers to the call girl that sets the appointment, which was normally CURTIS. T.N. states 
that CURTIS frequently called her and asked her to go to an appointment because the particular 
customer wanted a specific sexual act which other girls are notwilling to perform. 
Affiant 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5 
day of October, 2006. 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
DAVID E. YOCOM, District-Attorney 
Deputy District Attorney" 
October ^ ^ 2 0 0 6 
Addendum C 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 061906590 
vs. : 
S. STEVEN MAESE, : Judge Randall N. Skanchy 
Defendant. : 
The Court has before it the defendant S. Steven Maese's ("Mr. 
Maese") Motion for Arrest of Judgment and/or For a New Trial. The 
matters have been fully and extensively briefed and the parties argued 
the matter before the Court on October 27, 2008. The matter is now ready 
for decision. 
BACKGROUND 
On July 11, 2008, after a two day jury trial, the jury returned 
guilty verdicts against Mr. Maese in the above-entitled matter on the 
following counts: 
Count I - Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a Second Degree Felony 
Counts II, III, IV, V - Exploiting Prostitution, Third Degree 
Felonies 
The jury acquitted Mr. Maese on Count VI, Money Laundering, a Second 
Degree Felony. The charges arose as a result of Mr. Maese's ownership 
and operation of an escort service named the "Doll House," which was a 
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sexually oriented business, licensed in Park City, Summit County, Utah.1 
The Doll House, however, under Mr. Maese's ownership, was operated out 
of a residence in Cottonwood Heights, located in Salt Lake County, where 
the co-owner of the business, Tiffany Curtis ("Ms. Curtis"), resided. 
While the Doll House held itself out to be an escort service, the 
overwhelming weight of evidence produced at trial indicated it provided 
more client services than merely those associated with an escort service, 
but rather services which included sex acts, and the owners, the escorts 
and their clientele understood, or came to understand quite quickly, that 
prostitution was a service the Doll House and its escorts provided, and 
that anywhere from 50% to 90% of the Doll House customers fully expected 
and received some type of sexual activity from a Doll House escort. 
Legal Discussion 
A. Motion to Arrest Judgment 
At the conclusion of the trial, and prior to sentencing, Mr. Maese 
filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment, or, in the Alternative, a Motion 
for a New Trial. Motions to arrest Judgment are governed by Utah Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 23: 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court 
upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant 
shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not 
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill, 
or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment.... 
1Mr. Maese owned the Doll House with his then girlfriend, Tiffany Curtis, who had 
formerly worked as an escort, and had advised Mr. Maese about the "business" opportunities 
associated with an escort service. The Doll House was licensed in Park City, and maintained a 
small office there, but did no actual business from the Park City location. 
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Under Rule 23, a trial court should arrest Judgment if the evidence 
presented by the State or admitted to by a defendant "is so inconclusive 
or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element," that 
is, if it is factually insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. 
See, State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) . Thus, when Mr. 
Maese attacks the jury's verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, or lack 
of unanimity, it may be considered under Rule 23 prior to being 
sentenced. Mr. Maese urges the Court that it should arrest Judgment both 
because of the alleged insufficiency of the evidence and the lack of 
unanimity of the jury verdict. 
B. Motion for a New Trial2 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the basis 
upon which a new trial may be granted. The Court may grant a new trial 
in the interest of justice if "there is any error or impropriety which 
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party." 
Mr. Maese urges the Court to grant him a new trial because of the 
same two bases as set forth above, and various errors he ascribes to the 
Court, including not ruling upon, or compelling the State, to provide a 
2The State correctly notes that a Motion for New Trial should be filed after sentencing. 
See, Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. While Mr. Maese concurs with the 
State's assessment, he argues that Rule 23 permits a trial Court to exercise "wide discretion" in 
any considerations for the arrest of judgment, and that his arguments may be considered for both. 
This Court will consider all of the arguments of Mr. Maese without worrying whether the 
Motion for a New Trial could be considered now or later. 
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bill of particulars, permitting evidence to be presented to the jury of 
one of the escort's non-consensual sex acts, allowing the jury to 
consider four alternative statutory prongs as a basis for the Pattern of 
Unlawful Activity charge, permitting the introduction of a letter 
addressed to the parents of one of the escorts, penned by Mr. Maese, and 
actions or remarks by the prosecutor which Mr. Maese alleges was 
prosecutorial misconduct and which therefore prejudiced the trial. Mr. 
Maese alleges that any one of these issues had a "substantial adverse 
effect" upon his rights. The Court will address each of these arguments 
herein. 
1. Sufficient Evidence was Adduced by the State at Trial that Mr. Maese 
is Guilty of the Counts Charged Beyond a Reasonable Doubt. 
Notwithstanding the mountain of evidence provided at trial and the 
jury's verdict of guilt, Mr. Maese now urges the Court that such evidence 
was insufficient to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of his 
guilt. In the face of this evidence, it is as if Mr. Maese is asking the 
Court to look squarely into the brightness of an unobscured noonday sun 
and then seek to persuade the Court that the sun does not exist. Such 
is the quantum of evidence provided at trial to support the jury verdict. 
Without attempting to create an exhaustive list of the evidence 
provided at trial which supports the jury verdict on each of the 
respective counts, the following is a summary of the evidence provided 
at trial concerning the nature of the Doll House's business and the 
knowledge of Mr. Maese about the purpose of the business. 
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(a) After creation of the Doll House as a business, Mr. Maese and 
Ms. Curtis advertised it on a website which provided a link to a site 
entitled "The Erotic Review," which was a national posting of reviews of 
the places around the country where "erotic" escorts, massages, strip 
clubs, and "gentlemen clubs" could be located and the various types of 
"service" the clientele could expect from the individuals involved with 
a business such as the Doll House. (Trial Tr. Day 1 ("Tl") 16.) Mr. 
Maese put together the Doll House website, monitored the "reviews" his 
escorts received (Tl 84), wrote his own fictitious reviews of the sexual 
acts his escorts would perform for paying clients (Tl 117) and discussed 
bad reviews with the escorts to encourage them to generate "positive" 
reviews (Tl 114-15) . He specifically spoke to the escorts that refusing 
sex was bad for business and would result in a bad review. (Tl 125-27) 
(b) The Doll House employed numerous women as escorts, who were 
sent to various appointments, in which they were required to become 
completely naked. (Trial Transcript Day 2 ("T2") 270.) While Mr. Maese 
created a "Policy & Procedures Handbook" for the Doll House that 
explicitly prohibited sexual acts, it was understood that sex was the 
service the Doll House provided.3 This was certainly true as to the 
3A theme of Mr. Maese's defense was, that while escorts may have engaged in sex acts, 
he was oblivious to such activity and he presumed the business was only providing escort 
services that did not involve sex acts. Indeed, as part of his defense, Mr. Maese introduced 
evidence at trial that he had drafted a "policy and procedure manual" that explained that sex acts 
were not allowed by law or by the Doll House, and held at least two quarterly business meetings 
where escorts were trained by a legal professional as to what legally could or could not be done 
as an escort. As will be seen by a cursory review of the evidence, this was a facade, as the 
evidence suggests Mr. Maese fully understood sex was part of the service the Doll House 
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owners, Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis, who did all they could to make the Doll 
House a successful and lucrative concern. Financial success for an 
escort and for the Doll House involved sexual activity. 
(c) Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis often obtained the details of the 
escort's individual appointments, including the following low lights: 
(i) one escort noted to Mr. Maese that during an appointment 
where she performed oral sex the client "tasted" disgusting. (Tl 87-88); 
(ii) another escort complained to Mr. Maese that other escorts 
were not charging enough for sex so clients were reluctant to pay her the 
price she demanded for sex (Tl 103) , to which Mr. Maese told her that the 
fee she charged for sex was too much. (Tl 103, T2 187); and 
(iii) Mr. Maese told the escorts to "keep the guys happy but 
whatever happens between you guys is between you guys" (Tl 152-53); 
(iv) Mr. Maese attended a bachelor party with two of his 
escorts where oral sex was performed with clients. Mr. Maese accompanied 
the escorts to the event and called the Doll House to report they had 
arrived and collected the Doll House fee (Tl 97-98); 
(v) Mr. Maese told an escort during a dispute with a "regular" 
client over the fee for sexual intercourse that she was to go to a gas 
provided, he actively participated in "marketing" the types of sexual activity individual escorts 
would perform by creating fictitious reviews by supposed satisfied clientele, encouraged the 
escorts to provide the sex acts the clients demanded, and demanded that his escorts satisfy the 
clients and obtain "good" reviews from their clientele. The idea that sex acts were not permitted 
is more appropriately called a "wink, wink" defense, wherein Mr. Maese tells an escort not to do 
something, but fully expects them to do exactly that. 
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station, purchase condoms and go back and make the guy happy because he 
was a "regular." (T2 186); 
(vi) An escort told Mr. Maese that she had performed oral sex 
for $400 and Mr. Maese responded that for $400 she would need "to be a 
little more liberal than that." (T2 235-36); and 
(vii) In a dispute with an escort who left the Doll House to 
work with a competitor, Mr. Maese drafted and sent a letter to the 
escort's parents highlighting the sexual activities she had engaged in 
while an escort at the Doll House, which letter included photographs and 
the "reviews" she had received from The Erotic Review. (Tl 100-02, 133-
35) 
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(viii) Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis referred to the escorts who 
were willing to have sex with a client as "bailers" and/or that they 
would "play ball." (Testimony of Ms. Curtis)4 
(ix) Mr. Maese was present at least 70% of the time when one 
escort returned from appointments and paid the agency fee and was seen 
by this escort handling and wrapping the money in rubber bands. 
(Testimony of Allison H.) 5 
(x) A typical escort would do three to four dates a day, 
worked a 50 hour work week and engaged in sexual activity on 
approximately 50% of the appointments. (Testimony of Jennifer H.) 
(xi) One escort was involved in a non-consensual sex act from 
a regular client and she informed Mr. Maese, and he responded that the 
Doll House would never provide services to that client again. (Testimony 
of Heather T.) 
(xii) The witnesses testified that from 30% to 90% of the 
appointments scheduled by the Doll House involved sexual acts. 
(Testimony of Allison H., Jennifer H., Heather W., Danielle T., Allison 
J.) 
(xiii) Mr. Maese arranged some of the escort appointments with 
clients and drove the escorts to the location. (Testimony of Nicole F.) 
4Where the Court cites to testimony rather than to a reference in the trial transcript, it is 
because the Court does not have a trial transcript and is relying on its own trial notes. Where a 
trial transcript is referenced, it has been taken from the briefs of one of the litigants. 
5The witnesses who were escorts at the Doll House will be referred to in this Decision by 
their first name and last initial. 
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(xiv) In addition to a Doll House fee of $95 for each 
appointment, the escorts paid Ms. Curtis, the appointment scheduler, a 
"tip" of from ten to twenty percent of any additional money the escort 
earned from engaging in sex acts, which was commingled with Doll House 
fees. (T2 222, 226) . 
(xv) The more "tip" Ms. Curtis and the Doll House received 
from an escort, the more appointments the escort received. (T2 149-50, 
182) 
(xvi) The Erotic Review, reviewed and supplemented by Mr. 
Maese, detailed the sex acts the Doll House escorts performed. (Tl 12-
16, 82-84, 114-115, 127) 
(xvii) Mr. Maese checked the reviews of his escorts in The 
Erotic Review daily and discussed with Ms. Curtis and the escorts their 
respective reviews. (Tl 84, 114-115, 117, 125-27) 
(xviii) During the execution of a search warrant on the Doll 
House, law enforcement discovered hard copies of The Erotic Review which 
detailed the sexual repertoire of the Doll House escorts. (Tl 23) 
(xix) During the execution of a search warrant on the Doll 
House, law enforcement retrieved escort schedule lists, escort 
appointment lists, business application for the Doll House signed by Mr. 
Maese, and Doll House financial accounts signed by Mr. Maese, as well as 
financial records of money transfers from the Doll House to Mr. Maese's 
personal financial account. (Testimony of Detective Dan Bartlett) 
(xx) Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis abandoned the quarterly 
discussions with escorts about prohibitions against sex on appointments 
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because they "did not want the girls to think that they would get in 
trouble...if they were to have sex on an appointment." (Tl 72-80) 
(xxi) In a meeting with all the escorts, Mr. Maese went over 
The Erotic Review, and encouraged the escorts to work harder, provide 
more "services" for less money and generate better reviews so the Doll 
House could become the best escort service in Salt Lake City. (Testimony 
of Allison J.) 
(xxii) Mr. Maese spoke to one escort on strategies to employ 
to avoid getting busted for illegal sexual activity. (Testimony of 
Jennifer H.) 
(xxiii) The escorts felt pressure to provide sex on their 
appointments from the Doll House owners. (Testimony of Jennifer H.) 
• * * 
When a Court is asked to review a jury verdict on the grounds that 
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, the Court is to: 
...review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of 
the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. 
State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).) 
As set forth in this Court's summary recitation of the evidence, 
there is nothing insufficient or inconclusive in the evidence the State 
presented of Mr. Maese's guilt to support his conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Evidence of guilt is sufficient when a jury, based on 
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the evidence, may find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant 
committed the charged offenses. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah 
1980). Each piece of evidence does not need to be sufficient, in and of 
itself, to support a jury finding of guilt. State v. Gurr, 904 P. 2d 238, 
241-42 (Utah App. 1995). Rather, a court is to review the evidence in 
its totality to determine whether the totality of facts is sufficient to 
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 
In Gurr, the defendant argued that his conviction was not supported 
by sufficient evidence. .Id. at 240. To support his arguments, he 
isolated each piece of evidence presented by the prosecution, arguing 
that each by itself was insufficient to convict him. Ld. at 242. The 
court rejected his arguments stating, "Although Gurr offers alternative 
explanations for pieces of the evidence, those explanations would require 
us to view the evidence as individual still frames rather than a whole 
moving picture." Id. 
Mr. Maese is asking this Court to engage in the same limited view 
of each piece of evidence against him. But viewing the evidence in its 
totality, the jury correctly found that Mr. Maese knew the escorts 
working for him were performing sex acts for money, that he accepted 
money they received from the work, and that he encouraged them to 
prostitute themselves. Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1305, provides that a 
person may be found guilty of exploiting prostitution if he: 
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in 
a house of prostitution...; 
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another 
to become or remain a prostitute; 
(c) transports a person...within this state with a purpose to 
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promote that person engaging in prostitution...; 
(d) ...shares the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute 
pursuant to their understanding that he is to share therein; 
or 
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, 
alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution 
or a prostitution business. 
In the face of the quantum of evidence presented at trial it is an 
impossible task for Mr. Maese to argue that the quantum of evidence is 
insufficient or inconclusive as to his guilt. The impossibility of that 
task is only highlighted by each of the pieces of evidence Mr. Maese 
tries to explain away. Indeed, from Mr. Maese's own marshaling of the 
evidence and arguments thereon, one may conclude that: 
(i) Mr. Maese encouraged an escort who was unwilling to have 
unprotected sex to go get some condoms, work it out and make "the guy 
happy." Exploitation of Prostitution may be proven by encouraging, 
inducing or causing a person to become or remain a prostitute; 
(ii) Unhappy with a different escort who left the Doll House, 
Mr. Maese sent a letter to her parents detailing her sexual activity as 
an escort for the Doll House. Exploitation of Prostitution may be proven 
by the ownership, control or management of a prostitution business; 
(iii) Mr. Maese received proceeds from a sexual encounter by 
a Doll House escort for which she was forced to perform a sexual act for 
less than she demanded, and received money from the escorts from their 
appointments. Exploitation of Prostitution may be shown by the sharing 
of proceeds of prostitution. 
(iv) Mr. Maese maintained a house of prostitution by setting 
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up a website, handling advertisements, writing reviews of his escorts on 
The Erotic Review which contained information about sexual activity. 
Exploitation of Prostitution may be shown by owning, controlling, 
managing or supervising a prostitution business. 
Furthermore, the "low lights" list of activity stated above, the 
State provided sufficient and conclusive evidence to support claims 
against Mr. Maese for exploiting prostitution, including the following: 
(a) Procuring an individual to engage in prostitution : 
Mr. Maese interviewed, photographed, hired, trained and advertised for 
the Doll House escorts. Without exception, each of the escorts were 
interviewed and hired by Mr. Maese. One escort was drawn to the Doll 
House for employment by an ad she saw for the Doll House in a weekly 
newspaper. (Testimony of Allison J.) 
(b) Encouraging another to Become or Remain a Prostitute: 
Mr. Maese coached the escorts on what they could do to avoid being 
busted, he discussed their Erotic Reviews and encouraged better service 
for less money, commented on their pricing for sexual services if he felt 
it was too much or if they needed to provide more service for the price 
received, told them to keep their customers satisfied, and operated a 
business that gave the escorts referrals based on how much of a tip the 
Doll House received for the sexual activity of its escorts. 
(c) Transports a person with purpose to promote prostitution: 
Mr. Maese drove escorts to several appointments, at one of which he 
remained to take photographs. 
(d) Shares in proceeds of prostitution: Mr. Maese and the Doll 
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House collected tips from sexual activity of his escorts along with the 
standard agency fees. 
(e) Owned or controlled a prostitution business : Mr. Maese 
owned, operated and oversaw the business operation of the Doll House. 
After a review of the evidence, this Court concludes that the jury 
had sufficient and conclusive evidence as to the counts of Exploiting 
Prostitution to find Mr. Maese guilty on those charges. There is neither 
good cause to arrest the Judgment nor any error or impropriety that had 
a substantial adverse effect upon Mr. Maese's rights to warrant a new 
trial. 
As to the charge of Pattern of Unlawful Activity, those same facts 
support this Court's conclusion that the jury had sufficient and 
conclusive evidence as to the count for a Pattern of Unlawful Activity. 
2. Mr. Maese Received a Unanimous Verdict From the Jury 
Mr. Maese seeks to introduce evidence of jurors' statements that 
they were confused during deliberations by the Court's instructions 
regarding the specific acts that constitute Exploitation of Prostitution 
and their duty of returning a unanimous verdict. 
Mr. Maese argues that his verdict was not a unanimous verdict from 
the jury as three jurors expressed some confusion during deliberations 
concerning the jury instructions as it related to what specific acts may 
be found by the jury in order to return a verdict on a count of 
Exploitation of Prostitution. 
As previously noted, one may be guilty of Exploiting Prostitution 
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under five alternative categories of the crime. They include: 
(a) procuring an inmate for a house of prostitution; 
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another 
to become or remain a prostitute; 
(c) transports a person into or within this state, with the 
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution...; 
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute share 
the proceeds of prostitution...; or 
(e) owns, controls, manages supervises or otherwise keeps, 
alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a 
prostitution business. 
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1305 (1953, as amended.) 
During the jury deliberations, the jurors sent out the following 
question in referring to the elements section of the instruction on 
Exploiting Prostitution: 
Jury Question: In instruction #37, a, b, c, d, do all of them 
have to be fulfilled in order to find the defendant guilty or 
just one of the conditions met? Also the same question for 
instruction #40. 
The Court, after consultation with respective counsel submitted the 
following: 
Answer: Both instructions 37 and 40's subparagraphs (the a, b, 
c's) you refer to end with the word "or" and therefore should 
be read accordingly. 
Mr. Maese's argument is that the jury may have found him guilty on 
different categories of the offense, but not unanimously on the same 
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category. Mr. Maese's argument is unpersuasive both based on the Utah 
Rules of Evidence and on case law. 
(i) Utah Rule of Evidence 606 Precludes Consideration of Juror Statements 
Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) forbids the use of juror statements Mr. 
Maese gathered as to matters occurring during deliberations. Rule 606(b) 
states in part: 
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, 
a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement 
occurring during the course of the jury's 
deliberations...except that a juror may testify on the 
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was 
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any 
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any 
juror. Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the 
juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these 
purposes. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah law is clear as to the strictness of this rule. See, State v. Gee, 
498 P. 2d 662, 665-66 (Utah 1972) (specifying that juror testimony or 
affidavits may not be received to impeach the jury verdict). All of the 
statements provided by defense counsel allude to matters and statements 
which occurred and were made during the course of the jury's 
deliberations. Therefore, they may not be received for the purposes of 
impeaching the verdict in seeking a new trial. 
Rule 606(b) allows for consideration of juror testimony only to the 
extent that it may suggest the entry of "extraneous prejudicial 
information" in deliberations. The mere fact that several jurors were 
confused as to their duty of unanimity as to a specific crime and as to 
each element of that crime does not qualify as extraneous prejudicial 
information or improper influence for admission under Rule 606(b), 
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especially where that confusion was specifically addressed by the trial 
court and resolved. The Utah Supreme court has expressly held: 
In a long line of decisions in this jurisdiction, the 
principle has been firmly established that evidence by 
affidavit or testimony of a juror will not be received to 
impeach or question the jury verdict or to show the grounds 
upon which it was rendered, or to show their misunderstanding 
of fact or law, or that they misunderstood the charge of the 
court, or the effect of their verdict, or their opinions, 
surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict. 
State v. Gee, supra at 665-66 (emphasis added) ; see also, Johnson v. 
Simons, 551 P.2d 515, 516 (Utah 1976) (refusing juror affidavits 
indicating that jury was confused as to law stated in instructions) . The 
introduction of such evidence is expressly barred by Rule 606(b) and by 
the clear statements of the Utah Supreme Court. 
(ii) Utah Case Law Precludes Consideration of Juror Statements 
Mr. Maese cites Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1548 
(10th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that Federal Rule 606(b) is silent 
as to questioning the jury to confirm the accuracy of the verdict, and 
therefore should not preclude the testimony as to a potential 
miscommunication of the verdict. The Utah version of Rule 606(b) also 
does not specifically preclude evidence of verdict miscommunication. 
However, case law is clear that juror testimony may not be used to 
impeach or question the verdict or to show a misunderstanding of law or 
fact or the charge of the court. State v. Gee, 498 P. 2d 662, 665-66 
(Utah 1972) . The Utah Supreme Court has held that in general jurors must 
agree only to the crime charged, not a particular theory of the crime. 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987). In Tillman, the Court noted 
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that there are two classes of criminal statutes: (a) where there is one 
crime with various means to commit the crime, and (b) where the statute 
sets forth several acts, and commission of each is a separate crime. 
When the statute is (a) above (like the one at issue here) , the jury need 
only come to consensus about the crime itself, not the elements of the 
crime. Id. In State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1987) the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that: 
Many jurisdictions have considered the scope of the 
constitutional requirement of a unanimous jury verdict in 
criminal cases. The decisions are virtually unanimous that a 
defendant is not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the 
precise manner in which the crime was committed, or by which 
of several alternative methods or modes, or under which 
interpretation of the evidence so long as there is substantial 
evidence to support each of the methods, modes, or manners 
charged. 
Thus, if the statute under which the defendant is convicted defines one 
crime which may be committed several different ways, the defendant is not 
entitled to jury unanimity on the way in which the crime was committed. 
State v. Russell, Id. at 166. 
Such is the case here. Clearly there was sufficient evidence that 
the jury could rely upon to find that Mr. Maese (a) procured individuals 
to engage in prostitution or (b) encouraged individuals to become or 
remain prostitutes or (c) transported a person within the state to engage 
in prostitution or (d) shared in proceeds of prostitution and/or (e) 
owned a prostitution business, as has been previously discussed. 
Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and for a New Trial 
based on allegations of lack of juror unanimity fails. 
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(iii) Even if the Jurors' Statements are Considered, the Jury Requested 
and Received a Clarification as to the Courts Instructions, Curing Any 
Confusion and Preserving Mr. Maese#s Right to a Unanimous Verdict 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that juries are presumed to have 
relied on instructions given by the Court. See, State v. Harmon, 956 
P. 2d 262 (Utah 1998) . Mr. Maese asserts that after the jury received the 
clarification instruction from the Court "they immediately returned a 
guilty verdict on all four counts of Exploiting Prostitution." This, Mr. 
Maese argues, is evidence that the jury "violated [his] constitutional 
right to a unanimous verdict." 
In this case, the statements of three jurors as to the specific acts 
that may have constituted the counts of Exploitation of Prostitution is 
argued to have caused some confusion during the deliberations. However, 
the jury brought those questions to the Court, and the Court responded 
by clarifying the instruction that had previously been given. This 
response was considered and approved by counsel before returned to the 
jury.6 "If a trial judge could not correct errors as they occur, few 
trials would be successfully concluded." Harmon, 956 P.2d at 272. The 
Court in this case offered a corrective instruction. It is presumed 
under Utah law that it is that clarifying instruction which the jury 
followed in rendering their verdict, not some suggestion of personal 
confusion related by a juror that preceded this instruction. 
6While Mr. Maese's counsel acknowledges that he reviewed the answer to the jury 
question, he does not acknowledge that he "approved" it. There is no record however to suggest 
that Mr. Maese's counsel objected to the answer or proposed an alternative instruction. 
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3, Mr. Maese Fails to Demonstrate that the Lack of a Ruling on a Bill 
of Particulars Prejudiced Him 
Before the Court discusses the argument, a procedural history of 
this case bears some discussion. The Information in this case was 
originally filed October 4, 2006, and Amended on October 5, 2006. The 
Amended Information contained a Probable Cause Statement which detailed 
over the course of three pages the allegations supporting the criminal 
counts brought against Mr. Maese. 
After preliminary proceedings the Court set a jury trial for January 
9-11, 2008, with a pretrial on December 17, 2007. Mr. Maese was 
represented at these proceedings by an attorney different than the 
attorney who eventually handled his trial in July of 2008. On January 
7, 2008, approximately ten days before the beginning of the scheduled 
jury trial, the parties stipulated to a cancellation of the jury trial 
and the trial was reset for February 20 and 21, with a pretrial on 
February 11, 2008. On February 11, 2008, at the pretrial, nine days 
before the second time this matter was scheduled for trial, Mr. Maese 
moved, through his counsel, to continue the trial, which Motion was 
granted. The trial was reset for a third time on April 23, 2008, with 
a pretrial on April 14, 2008. At the pretrial on April 14, 2008, Mr. 
Maese's counsel indicated that he was prepared to go to trial on April 
23, 2008. However, on the first day of trial, April 23, 2008, Mr. Maese 
asked to discharge his lawyer, at which point the Court granted his 
counsel's Motion to Withdraw and assessed Mr. Maese costs for the 35 
jurors and seven witnesses who were prepared to appear on that day. 
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Thereafter, Mr. Athay, Mr. Maese's new trial counsel, made his record of 
appearance and the matter was thereafter set for its fourth jury trial 
setting on July 10 and 11, 2008, with a pretrial on July 7, 2008. 
Thereafter, Mr. Maese filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, 
which was briefed by the parties and argued at the pretrial conference 
three days before the jury trial was to begin on its fourth setting. At 
this pretrial conference additional argument was heard by the Court on 
a Motion to Disqualify the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office 
for their prosecution in the matter, which Motion was filed four days 
before the pretrial conference, and seven days before the trial was to 
begin. At the pretrial, after hearing arguments from the parties, the 
Court indicated it would render a written opinion on the pending Motions 
prior to the scheduled trial three days later. On that same day, July 
7, 2008, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order which denied 
the defendant's Motion to Disqualify the District Attorney's Office and 
indicated to the parties that "the trial will proceed as scheduled." 
(Memorandum Decision and Order, July 7, 2008.) The Court did not include 
in that Memorandum Decision any reference to Mr. Maese's Motion for a 
Bill of Particulars, and on the day of trial, after asking both the State 
and Mr. Maese if they were ready to proceed with the trial, which both 
affirmed they were, the trial commenced. The Court never issued a 
decision on Mr. Maese's Motion for a Bill of Particulars. 
Mr. Maese argues that the Court's failure to rule on his Motion for 
a Bill of Particulars caused him prejudice by depriving him of the 
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. 
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(i) Mr. Maese waived his right to a ruling on the Motion for a Bill 
of Particulars. 
Rule 12 (e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "A 
motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later 
determination." Rule 12 further provides in subsection (f) that, 
"Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to 
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the 
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may 
grant relief from such waiver." When the Court asked Mr. Maese on the 
day of trial if they were ready to proceed, and received an affirmative 
response, Mr. Maese effectively waived his right to obtain a ruling on 
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars by failing to object to the trial 
proceeding or to otherwise request the Court to issue its opinion before 
the trial began. Indeed, Mr. Maese should well have known that his 
Motion for a Bill of Particulars had been denied when the trial actually 
began. 
(ii) Mr. Maese suffered no adverse effect for lack of a Ruling on 
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars. 
a. The Amended Information Provided Adeguate Notice of the Charges 
Against Mr. Maese 
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that an 
accused ''shall have the right... to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him...." Utah Code Ann., further provides in § 77-14-
1 that the State provide an accused in writing "As is known to him the 
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place, date and time of the commission of the offense charged." In 
interpreting the obligation of the State, the Utah Supreme Court has held 
that one "be charged with a specific crime, so that he can know the 
particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct...." State v. Burnett, 712 
P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 1985). Mr. Maese's Motion for a Bill of Particulars 
sought the particulars of Counts II through V of the Amended Information, 
the Exploitation of Prostitution charges. 
Mr. Maese's claim that he was prejudiced by not receiving a ruling 
by the Court on his Bill of Particulars is not persuasive. Mr. Maese was 
not deprived of the opportunity to provide an adequate defense. The 
Amended Information provided three pages, and nine separate subparagraphs 
detailing the particulars of the crime charged. It provides in paragraph 
5, the following: 
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(a) an escort with initials N.F. was told by Mr. Maese the 
type of sex acts she should perform with a client during July 
and September, 2005, and further that she was told in response 
to a request for sex by a client to work it out; 
(b) an escort with initials A.F. was encouraged by Mr. Maese 
during October and December 2005 to engage in oral sex without 
a condom and that if she didn't engage in sex acts she would 
not get work; 
(c) an escort with initials H.R. discussed with Maese between 
September, 2 0 05 and February, 2 0 06, what to do if she was 
charged with Prostitution because of her sexual intercourse 
with Doll House clients; 
(d) an escort with initials J.H. paid Mr. Maese the Doll House 
fee after sex with clients; 
(e) an escort with initials D.T. was told by Mr. Maese during 
April and May 2006 in a dispute with a client over a fee for 
sex acts to "drive down the hill and get condoms and go back 
and work something out." 
(f) an escort named T.N. told Mr. Maese during the year 2005 
and 2006 of the specific sex acts she and the other escorts 
performed. 
In addition to the particulars set forth in the Amended Information, 
Mr. Maese had already been through a preliminary hearing in which dates, 
places and times of the alleged illegal conduct had occurred. In 
addition, Mr. Maese, over the almost two years of pendency of this 
litigation, had received the State's discovery, which included statements 
and interviews of the escort witnesses who would be testifying against 
him. 
Before Mr. Maese can prevail on his argument that the lack of a 
Court ruling on his Motion for a Bill of Particulars warrants a new 
trial, he must show that the failure prejudiced him by depriving him of 
the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense. Utah Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure 30 provides in subsection (a) that "Any error, defect, 
irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of 
a party shall be disregarded." 
For an error to affect the substantial rights of Mr. Maese, he must 
show that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
result would have been more favorable to the defendant. State v. Knight, 
734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987); see also, State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App. 238, 
166 P.3d 626. This has been interpreted as the "erosion of confidence" 
test and requires a two-part analysis: First, did the error impede the 
defendant's ability to prepare for trial? Second, did the error so 
impede his ability to prepare a defense that the likelihood of a 
different outcome was sufficiently high as to undermine the confidence 
in the verdict? .Id. at 920. Neither can be met here. 
Generally, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 0 puts the burden on the 
defendant to show prejudicial error. See, State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 
688 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (court denied Motion where the accused made no 
showing that further detail would've made any difference in the trial); 
State v. Swapp, 808 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991) (defendant did not show how his 
defense was prejudiced by the lack of knowledge; he made only a 
conclusory statement that it was difficult to defend). However, courts 
have found that the burden should shift to the State when it comes to a 
Motion for Bill of Particulars. The State must show that there is no 
reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome of the trial 
would have favored the defendant. See, State v. Knight, 734 P. 2d 913 
(Utah 1987); State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 104 (Utah 1998). 
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Even if this Court erred in failing to rule on the defendant's 
Motion for a Bill of Particulars, such an error does not warrant a new 
trial because it did not "affect the substantial rights of a party." Utah 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a). Put differently, because it is clear 
from the record that Mr. Maese was not entitled to a bill of particulars, 
any failure to issue an Order denying such bill of particulars is 
rendered harmless. 
In State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991), a decision 
heavily relied upon by Mr. Maese, the trial court did not explicitly rule 
on a Motion to Suppress which it had taken under advisement. In that 
case, however, the failure to issue a ruling on the Motion was harmful 
error because during the suppression hearing, there were numerous factual 
discrepancies among the testimony of the State's witnesses which were 
never ruled upon, and the appellate court was not able to resolve these 
factual discrepancies on its own upon appeal. _Id. at 787. Because of 
the factual discrepancies and the court's failure to resolve them, it was 
not clear whether Ramirez was entitled to have the evidence against him 
suppressed. Jd. at 788. In turn, the court was required to reverse his 
STATE V. MAESE PAGE 2 7 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
conviction and order a new trial because this was "harmful error." Id. 
at 789. 
The case before this Court is different. Unlike the hearing on the 
Motion to Suppress in Ramirez, there was no evidentiary hearing to 
consider in this case, and no factual discrepancies to consider. The 
only issue before this Court was whether Mr. Maese had received 
sufficient notice through the Amended Information's probable cause 
statement, and the evidence the State provided to him through discovery 
and a preliminary hearing as to what the charges were against him and the 
underlying evidence to support those charges, a finding the Court could 
make based upon the record. 
The record shows that the Amended Information charging Mr. Maese was 
constitutionally sufficient. In State v. Bernards, 166 P. 3d 626 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2007), the court explained that an Information is 
constitutionally sufficient if it fully apprises the defendant of the 
"State's evidence upon which the charge is based." JId. The court added 
that a "[l]ack of factual specificity" does not make an Information 
constitutionally deficient. Further, specific dates are not necessary 
when a count is part of an ongoing criminal enterprise. Jd. at ff 6, 18. 
The probable cause statement included with the Amended Information and 
the evidence the State provides to the defendant must be considered as 
part of the notice to the defendant. Id. at f 17. In Bernards, the 
defendant was charged with five counts of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a 
Child for sexually abusing his stepdaughter continuously "between 
September 2000 and January 23, 2008." Id. at 11 2, 4. The probable 
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cause statement described the evidence of each count. .Id. at 1 5. Even 
though two of the counts for which he was convicted provided a range of 
dates--Muring the first part of 2002" and "December 2002" the court held 
Bernards received sufficient notice because the abuse was part of a 
continuing criminal enterprise, the probable cause statement described 
the evidence for each count, and the State provided him with video and 
cassette tapes of interviews with the victim and transcripts of the 
interviews. Id. at 11 2, 17-18. 
As happened in Bernards, Mr. Maese received sufficient notice. The 
four counts of Exploiting Prostitution for which Mr. Maese sought a Bill 
of Particulars gives a date range--like the Information in Bernards--of 
July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, and the probable cause statement 
outlines the evidence the State used to charge him--just like the 
probable cause statement in Bernards. 
Moreover, the probable cause statement in this case gave the 
initials of former escorts, the dates during which they worked for Mr. 
Maese, and detailed accounts that as they worked for Mr. Maese they were 
expected to perform sex acts with their clients, and that Mr. Maese 
encouraged them in those enterprises. The Amended Information was more 
than sufficient to identify the witnesses against him and review the 
evidence occurring during their respective employment with the Doll 
House. Further, the State provided Mr. Maese with all the evidence it 
intended to use against him in response to discovery, including witness 
statements. Furthermore, Mr. Maese had the benefit of a Preliminary 
Hearing in which those charges had been more fully laid out. 
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Mr. Maese received constitutionally sufficient notice through the 
Amended Information, the probable cause statement, and the preliminary 
hearing, and the evidence the State provided to him. Mr. Maese was not 
impeded in his preparation for trial by a lack of specificity as to the 
charges against him, nor would the outcome have been any different. 
Unlike the scenario in Ramirez, there is no risk of harm to Mr. Maese 
because that finding is based upon the record. Mr. Maese's notion that 
a new trial would somehow act as a remedy is faulty reasoning because 
there is no unresolved factual issue to alter the case--only an unstated 
legal ruling which Mr. Maese's counsel himself waived the morning of 
trial, by indicating he was ready to proceed to try the case. 
4. Mr. Maese had Adequate Notice of Pattern of Unlawful Activity 
Mr. Maese argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the 
Amended Information referred to subsections 1, 2 and 3 of the statutory 
provisions for this offense, but not subsection 4, and that the jury 
instruction referred to all four subsections,7 thus not permitting Mr. 
Maese to be prepared to defend against such a charge. Subsection 4 of 
the statute provides that "it is unlawful for any person to conspire to 
violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2) or (3)." 
As previously noted in reference to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 
30(a), any variance in the Information "which does not affect the 
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded." Burnett, 712 P.2d 
7The Amended Information charges Mr. Maese with a violation of Utah Code Ann., § 76-
10-1603(3), but in its body continued with a recital of subsections 1, 2 and 3. The recital omits 
subsection 4. 
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at 262. Thus, Mr. Maese must show that the variance prevented him from 
having notice of the charge and hindered his ability to defend against 
the charge. State v. Kirgan, 712 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1985). 
Here the Amended Information makes specific reference to subsections 
(1) , (2) and (3) and, while not making a specific reference to the number 
(4), sets forth the conspiracy nature of the charge. The Amended 
Information alleges that the parties conspired to undertake the illegal 
activities as outlined in subsections 1-3 and further sets forth that 
pursuant to such conspiracy the defendants exploited prostitution. Mr. 
Maese received notice of the charge of conspiracy as part of a Pattern 
of Unlawful Activity and the variance in the charging document did not 
affect a substantial right of Mr. Maese. 
5. The Admission of Testimony Regarding a Sexual Assault was 
Probative and Non-Prejudicial 
Mr. Maese argues that the Court improperly admitted evidence during 
the trial that one of his escorts had been the victim of a sexual assault 
during a specific appointment as a Doll House escort. Mr. Maese argues 
that the inclusion of such evidence was prejudicial to him as it was not 
relevant, and painted "him as a party to the rape, after the fact." 
Throughout the trial Mr. Maese's defense theory was that while sexual 
activity may have taken place between his escorts and Doll House 
clientele, he was wholly unaware of it. Thus, evidence of a conversation 
between Mr. Maese and an escort about sexual activity occurring during 
the course of a Doll House appointment was highly relevant and probative 
on the issue of whether Mr. Maese knew that his escorts were engaging in 
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sexual activity on their appointments with Doll House clients, and that 
the fees and tips the Doll House received were from prostitution 
activities. The evidence adduced at trial was that a regular customer 
of the Doll House expected sex during his appointment with an escort, and 
paid for his non-consensual sex with the escort and that the Doll House 
shared in the proceeds. Thus, the evidence was relevant and probative 
and not unfairly prejudicial. Furthermore, the record was replete that 
Mr. Maese did not engage in that act nor condone the non-consensual 
nature of the act and further offered to report the matter to 
authorities. (Testimony of Heather T.) 
Even if the evidence was admitted erroneously, it was harmless. 
Even without the testimony of this particular event, there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the case would have been any 
different, given the volume of testimony adduced at trial. This Court 
finds that there was no substantial adverse effect upon Mr. Maese's 
rights to warrant a new trial, and no good cause to arrest Judgment. 
Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and/or Motion for New 
Trial is denied. 
6. The Admission of the Allison J. Letter was Probative and Not Unfairly 
Prejudicial 
Mr. Maese argues that the admission of the letter he drafted to 
Allison J.'s parents accusing her of being a prostitute was irrelevant 
and unfairly prejudicial, and was evidence of other wrongs and therefore 
should require an Arrest of Judgment or New Trial. Again, the Court 
notes that Mr. Maese's defense was grounded upon the premise that he was 
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not aware of the prostitution his escorts were engaged in. Thus to now 
argue that the admission of a letter, penned in his own hand, informing 
the parents of one of his former escorts, that their daughter was engaged 
in prostitution while in his employment is not relevant to the issue 
before the Court is specious. It is relevant and not unduly prejudicial. 
Furthermore, the admission of such a letter was not offered as 
evidence of any pertinent trait of character of Mr. Maese, although it 
certainly tells a person about the nature of a person who would do such 
a thing over an employment dispute. The letter was not offered to show 
action in conformity with a character trait of Mr. Maese, but rather to 
demonstrate Mr. Maese's knowledge that Doll House escorts provided sex 
acts in exchange for money. To this end the letter detailed the conduct 
Allison J. engaged in while an escort of the Doll House and contained 
reviews from The Erotic Review which included detailed descriptions of 
the sex acts she was willing to engage in for a fee as a Doll House 
escort. The letter further corroborated the testimony of Allison J. and 
other Doll House escorts that Mr. Maese was aware of the revenue Allison 
J. could generate for the Doll House and what exactly she had to do to 
generate that income. Accordingly, the letter's probative value was not 
substantially outweighed by whatever prejudicial effect it may have had 
for Mr. Maese. Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment/New 
Trial is denied as to this issue. 
7. The State Did Not Violate Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure 
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure outlines the 
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requirements of a prosecutor in disclosing to the defense specified 
evidence obtained in the prosecution of a case. The obligation to 
produce such information is contingent upon request by a defendant and 
is a continuing obligation which requires a prosecutor to disclose newly 
acquired information. State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994). 
The issue Mr. Maese raises here is whether he received complete 
information from the State as a result of testimony elicited either at 
trial or contained in the Amended Information's probable cause statement 
for which no interview or notes of such material was allegedly provided. 
Those areas include: 
(a) reference in the probable cause statement of the Amended 
Information attributed to Nicole F. that said "B*tch, you are 
gonna have to make it work"; 
(b) reference to trial testimony from Ms. Curtis that an escort 
named Tatiana told Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis about explicit sex 
acts and another incident wherein Mr. Maese attended a 
bachelor party where Doll House escorts provided sex acts to 
the celebrants. 
The State responded by alleging that it supplied all material it had 
related to statements it received from Nicole F. and that while a summary 
of an interview of Nicole F. in the probable cause statement prepared by 
Detective Dan Bartlett ("Detective Bartlett") does not contain the 
statement alleged to have been made by Nicole F., that statement "or one 
substantially similar" is in the video recording of Nicole F.'s interview 
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with Detective Bartlett, and that that video recorded interview was 
provided to Mr. Maese's counsel before trial. Accordingly, the Court 
finds no merit in Mr. Maese's argument that the State withheld 
information from him on this issue. 
As to Ms. Curtis' statements, the State points to specific date-
stamped documents that make specific mention of bachelor parties 
conducted by Doll House escorts. The State further notes that the mere 
fact that a witness may testify at trial to something does not suggest 
that the State knew of such testimony before trial and failed to disclose 
it. It is not uncommon for witnesses to provide statements at trial 
never made in interviews with counsel before trial. The State represents 
it never interviewed an escort of the Doll House named Tatiana, nor did 
they interview Ms. Curtis about Tatiana. Accordingly, the Court finds 
no merit in Mr. Maese's argument on this point. 
Mr. Maese fails to provide a basis for this Court to conclude that 
the State withheld any information in violation of Rule 16. 
8. The State Did Not Engage in Prosecutorial Misconduct by Drawing 
Reasonable Inferences From the Evidence and Questioning Mr. Maese's 
Credibility 
Mr. Maese argues that the prosecutor in this case engaged in 
misconduct in his closing argument by arguing that Heather T. transferred 
money to Mr. Maese from an incident of non-consensual sex and that Mr. 
Maese's testimony in the area of "compliance" meetings with Doll House 
escorts was not credible. 
(a) Reasonable Inference 
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A prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence 
adduced at trial and argue them to the jury. State v. Bakalov, 979 P. 2d 
799 (Utah 1999). The State noted in its argument that Heather T. never 
actually said that she paid Mr. Maese the agency fee for the incident, 
but that it is a reasonable inference which can be drawn from the 
evidence.8 Several witnesses, including Heather T., testified that Mr. 
Maese and Ms. Curtis routinely received $95 for every appointment a Doll 
House escort handled and typically a tip on top of that. Heather T. 
testified that after she was sexually assaulted, she received $300 or 
$400 as a tip, and also collected an agency fee. She testified that she 
returned back to the Doll House immediately after the assault. It was 
reasonable to infer from this testimony that she paid a Doll House fee 
for the appointment. Further, Heather T. testified that "when we would 
return from the appointment we would go and meet back up with Tiffany and 
Steve, we would give them the agency fee which was at least $100,...and 
then the tip we would give to Tiffany because she is the phone person." 
(See T2 at 166.) Therefore, it was a reasonable inference that could be 
drawn from the testimony, and argued to the jury. The Court finds no 
merit in Mr. Maese's argument on this point, nor that it either had a 
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of Mr. Maese or that good 
cause exists to arrest the Judgment or grant a new trial. 
(b) Credibility of Mr, Maese 
8The State further asserts that Heather T. had so testified at the earlier preliminary 
hearing and that the official transcript of the trial is inaudible in parts at this point in the 
testimony as a result of the emotional state of the witness. (State Memo in Opposition, p. 29.) 
STATE V. MAESE PAGE 3 6 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
As to testimony a defendant may provide at trial, a prosecutor is 
free to comment on credibility. "When a defendant has testified during 
trial, it is proper during a closing argument to comment on defendant's 
credibility and appearance." State v. Jimenez, 21 P. 3d 1142 at 1145 
(Utah Ct. App 2001) . See also, State v. Larsen, 2005 Utah App 201, % 14, 
113 P.3d 998; State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1283-84 (Utah 1989); 
United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 436 (5th Cir. 2001) (A 
prosecutor may assert a witness is not credible if he supports his 
assertion with admitted evidence.) 
Here, the testimony Mr. Maese provided about regular "compliance" 
meetings was contradicted by Mr. Maese's own witnesses, who testified 
that only two meetings were held. (State Memo in Opp. p. 25.) Indeed, 
the testimony from Ms. Curtis corroborated the fact that compliance 
meetings, while initially held on a regular basis, were disbanded 
altogether because of concerns about scaring the escorts from engaging 
in sex acts. (Tr. Tl 72-80) Clearly, there was a discrepancy between 
Mr. Maese's testimony and the evidence presented by other witnesses, for 
which the credibility of the testimony could be challenged. 
Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and/or Motion for 
new Trial is denied. 
Sentencing of Mr. Maese is set for December 22, 2008, at noon. 
Dated this day of December, 2008. 
RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Addendum D 
The final test of the quality of your service will be the verdict you return. You 
will contribute to efficient judicial administration if you focus exclusively on this case 
and return a just and proper verdict. 
25. REACHING A VERDICT 
This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must 
agree. When you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work 
is finished. 
26. HOW TO REPORT YOUR VERDICT 
When you have reached a verdict, the Chair should date and sign the verdict 
form which corresponds to your decision. Then notify the bailiff that you are ready to 
return to court. 
27. W H A T HAPPENS AFTER THE VERDICT HAS BEEN REPORTED 
After you have given your verdict to the judge, he or the clerk may ask each of 
you about it to make sure you agree with it. Then you will be excused from the jury 
box and you may leave at any time. You may remain in the courtroom, if you wish, to 
watch the rest of the proceedings, which should be quite brief. 
After you are excused, you may talk about the case with anyone. Likewise, you 
are not required to talk about it. If anyone attempts to talk to you about the case when 
you don't want to do that, please tell the Court Clerk. 
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Addendum E 
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE 
AT JACKSON 
Assigned on Briefs December 4, 2001 
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. AVIS NEAL 
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County 
No. 97-09071 W. Fred Axley, Judge 
No. W2001-00374-CCA-R3-CD - Filed January 28, 2002 
The Defendant, Avis Neal was convicted by a Shelby County jury of one count of rape of a child. 
After a sentencing hearing, he was sentenced as a Range I standard offender to twenty years in the 
Department of Correction. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) the trial court erred in 
admitting testimony concerning statements made by the victim to her mother, (2) the trial court's 
reasonable doubt instruction was deficient, (3) the State failed to make a proper election, (4) the 
evidence is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and (5) the trial 
court erred in denying the Defendant's motion for new trial due to the Defendant's out of court 
contact with a juror. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed 
DAVID H. WELLES, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which GARY R. WADE, P.J. and DAVID 
G.HAYES, J., joined. 
Christine W. Stephens, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Avis Neal. 
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Elizabeth B. Marney, Assistant Attorney General; 
William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; and Julie Mosley, Assistant District Attorney 
General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee. 
OPINION 
In early September 1996, the Defendant was living with Rochelle James, a long-time 
girlfriend and mother of his three children. The oldest of the children, a ten year old daughter, is the 
victim in this case. The victim testified that shortly after she started school in 1996, the Defendant 
entered her room while her mother was at work and penetrated her vagina with his finger. The 
victim pretended to be asleep during the assault, and told no one of the assault afterwards. A few 
weeks later, the Defendant again entered the victim's room and penetrated her vagina, this time with 
his penis. Again, the victim pretended to be asleep during the rape, and told no one afterwards. The 
next day, Ms. James, the victim's mother, noticed a blood stain on the victim's panties and asked 
if the victim had begun to menstruate. The victim said she did not know, and Ms. James explained 
to her what to expect during menstruation. Between Thanksgiving and Christmas of the same year, 
the Defendant entered the victim's room again and penetrated both her vagina and her anus with his 
penis. The victim again pretended to be asleep during the rape. The victim testified that she told 
no one because she feared her father would harm her or her family. 
On January 22,1997, the Defendant again entered the victim's room, removed her from the 
bed she was sharing with her younger brother and sister, placed her on the floor and penetrated her 
vagina and anus with his penis. The next day, the victim recorded the attack in a diary she received 
for Christmas. The diary entry for January 23, 1997 reads, "[m]y dad is a bitch because he put his 
dick in me and he does - and I don't like my daddy." 
In early February, the victim and Ms. James were arguing about a poor grade on the victim's 
report card when the victim finally told Ms. James about the abuse. Ms. James testified that she took 
the victim to a clinic to be examined. Ms. James further stated that she remembered the blood stain 
on the victim's panties, and that she had asked the victim if she was menstruating. Ms. James 
testified that the victim's grades dropped between September of 1996 and February of 1997, and that 
she was punishing the victim for a bad report card on the day the victim told her about the abuse. 
Sally DiScenza, a family nurse practitioner specializing in examining victims of sexual 
assault and an expert in the field of forensic examination, examined the victim and found evidence 
of penetration. The victim's perihymenal tissue was abnormally narrowed, indicating some form 
of penetration. The victim's hymen tissue was also irregular, indicating trauma due to penetration. 
The victim's vaginal opening was fifteen millimeters, much larger than the seven to ten millimeters 
expected for a normal ten year old. The victim also had scarring around her anus, indicating 
penetration. Ms. DiScenza testified that the victim's description of the Defendant's abuse was 
consistent with the trauma to her vagina and anus. 
Several friends of the Defendant testified regarding his reputation for truth and honesty. 
Vannessa Bryson-Neal, the Defendant's wife, testified that she had been dating the Defendant 
sporadically for about twelve years. Ms. Bryson-Neal stated that she has had several altercations, 
some violent, with Ms. James about the Defendant. The Defendant testified that he dated both Ms. 
James and Ms. Bryson-Neal at different times over the past twelve years, and he believed that Ms. 
James was very jealous of Ms. Bryson-Neal. The Defendant further testified that he did not abuse 
his daughter in any way, and that he could not explain her injuries. 
VICTIM'S STATEMENTS TO MOTHER 
The Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by admitting testimony by Ms. James that 
the victim told her about the abuse. The Defendant contends that this testimony was inappropriate 
hearsay testimony admitted contrary to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 802. We agree that the trial 
court erred in admitting the statement, but find the error to be harmless. 
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Tennessee Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." Tenn. R. Evid. 801(c). Rule 802 makes all hearsay inadmissible unless the statement falls 
under one of the exceptions listed in Rule 803. See Tenn. R. Evid. 802, 803. At trial, the following 
exchanged occurred during Ms. James' testimony: 
[Assistant District Attorney]: And what made it end? 
[Ms. James]: My daughter came to me and told me that her father 
had been messing with her. 
[Defense Attorney]: Objection. 
The Court: State your grounds. Sir? 
[Defense Attorney]: I object on the grounds of hearsay, Your Honor. 
The Court: Do you want to respond? 
[Assistant District Attorney]: This is not going to the matter asserted. It's going to 
show what she did and why she did it and her state of 
mind. 
The Court: That's the exception. I will give an instruction to the 
jury. 
Immediately following the exchange, the trial court gave the jury a limiting instruction explaining 
that they could consider the statement in light of Ms. James' actions after hearing the statement and 
not for the truth of the statement itself. Ms. James then testified that her daughter told her that the 
Defendant "took his thing out and stuck it in her." 
The State argues that the testimony was elicited from Ms. James, not to prove that the rapes 
actually occurred, but to provide the link between the victim's testimony and the actions of Ms. 
James that followed. Therefore, the State asserts that the trial court properly overruled the 
Defendant's objection because the statement in question was not hearsay. We must respectfully 
disagree. 
The testimony of Ms. James that the victim said the Defendant was "messing" with the 
victim and "put his thing in her" can have no other effect but to corroborate and bolster the victim's 
testimony that she was raped by the Defendant. In our view, the testimony was hearsay offered to 
prove the truth of the statement, that the Defendant was sexually abusing the victim, and the trial 
court erred in admitting the testimony. See Tenn. R. Evid. 801. However, in light of the proof 
presented by the State, the limiting instruction given by the trial judge, and, specifically, the 
testimony of the victim that the Defendant was abusing her, we conclude that Ms. James testimony 
was cumulative of the proof already presented, and the trial court's error was clearly harmless. See 
Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52 (a); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18,23-24 (1967); 
Phippsv. State. 474 S.W.2d 154,156 (1971); State v. Kennedy. 7 S.W.3d 58,69 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
1999). This issue is without merit. 
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REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
The defendant next contends that the trial court erred in its reasonable doubt instruction to 
the jury. In particular, he argues that the court's failure to issue the standard pattern jury instruction 
containing "moral certainty" language lowered the standard of proof by which the State had to prove 
him guilty of the offense. We must respectfully disagree. 
The defendant asked that the trial court instruct the jury on reasonable doubt by use of 
Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03, which contains language that the jury must find the 
defendant guilty to a moral certainty. The trial court refused the request, opting instead to use 
Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03(a), which provides as follows: 
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful and 
impartial consideration of all the evidence in this case. It is not necessary that the 
defendant's guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt, as absolute certainty of guilt 
is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge. A reasonable doubt 
is just that-a doubt that is reasonable after an examination of all the facts of this 
case. If you find that the state has not proven every element of the offense beyond 
a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty. 
The defendant complains that this instruction fails to adequately define the meaning of 
reasonable doubt in the context of a criminal trial, allowing the jury to convict a defendant on less 
proof than that required by the "moral certainty" language of Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03. 
We have previously rejected similar challenges to the use of Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 
2.03(a). See, e ^ , State v. Ronald D. Coirell No. 03C01-9801-CC-00318, 1999 WL 812454, at * 
8 (Tenn. Crim. App., Knoxville, Oct. 8, 1999), perm, to appeal denied (Tenn. April 24, 2000) 
(holding that T.P.L-Crim. 2.03(a) is consistent with principles of due process); State v. Tony Fason, 
No. 02C01-9711-CR-00431, 1999 WL 588150, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Aug. 6, 1999), 
perm, to appeal denied (Tenn. Feb. 7, 2000) (" 'Moral certainty' is not required language in a jury 
instruction."); State v. Roscoe L. Graham. No. 02C01-9507-CR-00189, 1999 WL 225853, at *12 
(Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, April 20, 1999) (holding that reasonable doubt instruction omitting 
language of moral certainty is adequate). In State v. Melvin Edward Henning, No. 02CO1-9703-
CC-00126, 1997 WL 661455, at *9 (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Oct. 24, 1997), we rejected a 
challenge that Tennessee Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03(a) was constitutionally deficient because it 
did not contain "moral certainty" language: 
Tennessee Pattern Instruction 2.03(a) tracks virtually identical language of pattern 
reasonable doubt instructions approved by a majority of the federal circuits. See, 
e.g.. United States v. Velasquez, 980 F.2d 1275, 1278 (9th Cir.1992), cert, denied, 
508 U.S. 979 (1993); United States v. Campbell, 874 F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir.1989); 
United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1039 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Kirbv, 
838 F.2d 189,191-192 (6th Cir.1988); United States v. Colon, 835 F.2d 27, 31-32 
(2nd Cir.1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 980 (1988); United States v. Dilg, 700 F.2d 
620 (11th Cir.1983); United States v. Alonzo, 681 F.2d 997, 1002 (5th Cir.), cert 
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denied. 459 U.S. 1021 (1982); United States v. Robertson. 588 F.2d 575, 579 (8th 
Cir.1978), cert, denied, 441 U.S. 945 (1979). Moreover, the questioned language 
"based upon reason and common sense" and "absolute certainty is not required" has 
repeatedly been upheld as passing constitutional muster. See, e.g.. United States v. 
Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir.1996), cert, denied.- U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 1015 (1997); 
United States v.Miller. 84 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir.), cert. denied.-U.S.-. 117 S.Ct. 443 
(1996) overruled on other grounds by United States v. Holland. 116 F.3d 1353 (10th 
Cir.1997); United States v. Campbell. 61 F.3d 976, 980-981 (1st Cir.1995), cert, 
denied. — U.S. -—, 116 S.Ct. 1556 (1996); Hail, 854 F.2d at 1038- 1039; United 
States v. Rahm. 993 F.2d 1405, 1412 (9th Cir.1993). 
We do not find the instruction to be constitutionally deficient. We find no reasonable 
likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to permit conviction after anything but a process 
of careful deliberation or upon less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This issue is without 
merit. 
ELECTION OF OFFENSE 
The Defendant also contends that the State did not properly elect a specific incidence upon 
which the State relied to support the rape charge. During the State's closing argument, the trial court 
interrupted the State's attorney in order to remind him to make an election. The State informed the 
trial court, and the jury during his argument, that the State would rely on the rape that occurred on 
January 22,1997. Based upon this, the Defendant argues that he was not given notice of the charges 
brought against him and that the instruction given by the trial court was insufficient to ensure 
unanimity as to the specific illegal action of which the Defendant was convicted. We must 
respectfully disagree. 
The right to jury unanimity requires that the jury be unanimous as to the specific act which 
the Defendant committed upon which their judgment rests. See State v. Hodge. 989 S.W.2d 717, 
720 (Term. Crim. App. 1998); State v. Brown. 823 S.W.2d 576, 582 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). A 
trial court has the duty of requiring the State to elect the particular act upon which it relies for 
conviction and to instruct the jury so that the verdict of all jurors will be united as to one offense. 
See Burlisonv. State. 501 S.W.2d 801, 804 (Tenn.1973). When the State presents proof on many 
offenses within an alleged time period, but neglects election, the jury is improperly allowed to "reach 
into the brimming bag of offenses and pull out one for each count." Tidwell v. State. 922 S.W.2d 
497, 501 (Tenn. 1996). 
Furthermore, a conviction that is not unanimous as to the defendant's specific illegal action 
is no more justifiable than a conviction by a jury that is not unanimous on a specific count. See 
Hodge. 989 S.W.2d at 721. Where the State presents evidence of numerous offenses, the trial court 
must augment the general jury unanimity instruction to insure that the jury understands its duty to 
agree unanimously to a particular set of facts. Id A skeletal jury instruction of unanimity ferments 
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a strong possibility of a composite jury verdict in violation of an appellant's constitutional rights. 
Id 
Pursuant to a pretrial motion, the Defendant received a Bill of Particulars from the State that 
detailed the five specific incidents that the State sought to prove at trial. Included in the Bill of 
Particulars was the vaginal and anal penetration that occurred on January 22, 1997. Based on the 
Bill of Particulars provided the Defendant by the State, we find that the Defendant had adequate 
notice of the specific conduct for which he was to be prosecuted. 
Furthermore, the instruction given by the trial court was sufficient to ensure that the verdict 
returned by the jury was unanimous with regard to the specific conduct of the Defendant. The trial 
court's instruction stated 
The alleged victim, [name omitted] in indictment number 97-09071 has 
testified to several alleged sexual encounters with the defendant. The State must 
make an election as to which particular offense the Jury must consider in arriving at 
your verdict. 
In indictment number 97-0971 charging the defendant with the offense of 
Rape of a Child the Court charges you that you may consider the testimony 
concerning the alleged rape that occurred at the family's apartment on January 22, 
1997. 
You may also consider all of the alleged incidents that occurred before and 
after that date in arriving at your verdict. 
Additionally, the State's attorney informed the jury during closing arguments that their verdict must 
be unanimous in regard to a specific instance of child rape. 
There were at least five [instances of abuse] that [the victim] named. You 
have to all agree on one. That's why its unanimous. You have to be unanimous 
about not only that he's been raping her, but that this particular rape occurred. Does 
that make sense to everybody? 
And I have to pick the one that you have to agree on, yes or no. 
Now there are five different incidents that she described. Some of them she 
was able to date very specifically. Some of them she was not able to date very 
specifically. 
And you can consider all of that when you determine whether or not you think 
she is telling the truth and how reasonable it is to believe and how it fits into 
conjunction with the physical evidence as far as her injuries. 
But I'm going to make an election, which is what they call it, again, another 
technical term, of that January 22nd, 1997 rape. 
Okay. Now you can talk about the others and consider that all together as part 
of the proof, but you have to all agree that that particular incident occurred. 
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The trial court's instruction concerning the prosecution's election of the January 22, 1997 
rape, together with the prosecutor's comments during closing argument, were sufficient to ensure 
the unanimity of the jury's verdict.1 Therefore, this issue is without merit. 
SUFFICIENCY 
Next, the Defendant contends that, due to the lack of DNA evidence linking him to the rape 
of the victim, the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
We must respectfully disagree. 
Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 13(e) prescribes that "[findings of guilt in criminal 
actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support 
the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Evidence is sufficient if, after 
reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); State v. Smith. 24 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tenn. 2000). In addition, because 
conviction by a trier of fact destroys the presumption of innocence and imposes a presumption of 
guilt, a convicted criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient. 
See McBeev. State. 372 S.W.2d 173, 176 (Tenn. 1963): see also State v. Buggs. 995 S.W.2d 102, 
105-06 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Evans. 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Tuggle, 639 
S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982). 
In its review of the evidence, an appellate court must afford the State "the strongest legitimate 
view of the evidence as well as all reasonable and legitimate inferences that may be drawn 
therefrom." Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d at 914; see also Smith, 24 S.W.3d at 279. The court may not "re-
weigh or re-evaluate the evidence" in the record below. Evans, 838 S.W.2d at 191; see also Buggs, 
995 S.W.2d at 105. Likewise, should the reviewing court find particular conflicts in the trial 
testimony, the court must resolve them in favor of the jury verdict or trial court judgment. Tuggle, 
639 S.W.2d at 914. All questions involving the credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be 
given the evidence, and all factual issues are resolved by the trier of fact, not the appellate courts. 
See State v.Morris, 24 S.W.3d 788,795 (Tenn. 2000); State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620,623 (Tenn. 
Crim. App. 1987). 
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon to convict him, the Defendant 
contends that, without DNA evidence, no reasonable jury could have found him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. We disagree. The victim testified that the Defendant penetrated her vagina and 
anus with either his finger or his penis on numerous occasions. After one such occasion, the victim's 
mother noticed a blood stain in the victim's underwear. The victim recorded her anger regarding her 
father's assaults in her diary. Finally, Ms. DiScenza, a family nurse practitioner specializing in 
Clearly the better practice is for the trial judge to give the jury an enhanced jury unanimity instruction advising 
that the jury must unanimously agree that the facts relied upon for the conviction relate to the particular offense elected 
by the State. 
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examining victims of sexual assault and an expert in the field of forensic examination, examined the 
victim and discovered injuries to the victim's vagina and anus that could only be caused by some 
form of penetration. Ms. DiScenza testified that the type of injuries she discovered were consistent 
with the victim's description of the Defendant's abuse. 
We find ample evidence to support the jury's verdict. This issue is without merit. 
CONTACT WITH A JUROR 
Finally, the Defendant asserts that he is entitled to a new trial due to his alleged contact with 
a juror during his trial. At the hearing on the Motion for New Trial, the Defendant presented the 
testimony of a juror from his trial. The juror stated that during the trial of the Defendant, she and 
the Defendant rode on the same elevator. The juror testified that she was never alone on the elevator 
with the Defendant, and she did not communicate with the him in any way, however, the incident 
frightened her. The juror mentioned the incident to two other jurors immediately after it happened, 
but the incident was never mentioned after that. 
It is the law in Tennessee that an unexplained sequestered juror conversation with a third 
party is good cause for a new trial. See State v. BlackwelL 664 S.W.2d 686, 689 (Tenn.1984). 
However, when a jury is not sequestered, the validity of a verdict is questionable only when there 
is extraneous prejudicial information or any outside influence brought to bear on a juror. Id. In the 
present case, the jury was not sequestered, and the burden is on the Defendant's to show that the 
juror in question received prejudicial information or was subjected to outside influence. 
In Blackwell the Supreme Court adopted Rule 606(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
defined the type of evidence admissible from a juror to impeach a jury verdict. This holding, 
subsequently established as Rule 606(b) of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, prohibits a juror from 
giving testimony on any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations 
or the effect of anything upon a juror's mind or emotion as influencing his or her vote except that 
a juror may testify on the question of whether any extraneous prejudicial information was improperly 
brought to the jury' s attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any juror. 
If it is shown that one or more jurors has been exposed to extraneous prejudicial information 
or improper influence, there arises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice, and the burden then shifts 
to the prosecution to explain the conduct or to demonstrate the harmlessness of it. See BlackwelL 
664 S.W.2d at 689; State v. Young. 866 S.W.2d 194, 196 (Term. Crim. App., 1992). In order to 
shift the burden to the prosecution to demonstrate the harmlessness of the communication with the 
jury, the threshold question is whether the statement communicated to the jury was prejudicial to the 
Defendant. In the present case, there is no evidence that a communication actually occurred. 
Without evidence of a communication, there can be no evidence that the communication prejudiced 
the Defendant. We cannot say that the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's Motion for New 
Trial. This issue is without merit. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court's error in allowing statements made to 
the victim's mother by the victim into evidence was harmless, the trial court properly instructed the 
jury regarding reasonable doubt, the State properly elected the offense that occurred on January 22, 
1997, the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict, and the trial court did not err in denying the 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED. 
DAVID H. WELLES, JUDGE 
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